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1 
Introduction 
As the international community has gradually concluded that development and 
sustainability are far from mutually exclusive, attention has been devoted towards 
examining how to initiate sustainable development processes. Sustainable development 
as a concept was first defined in a report released by the Brundtland Commission in 1987 
titled “Our Common Future” as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”1 The concept 
was elaborated upon in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 
known as the Rio Earth Summit, out of which came some of the most defining 
international environmental conventions to this day: Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), and the UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity.2  
While there are many policy options for those looking to pursue sustainable 
development agendas, the energy sector is often at the forefront of conversations 
regarding sustainable development. One of the primary contributors to GHG emissions, 
and consequently, climate change, is the energy sector: the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2014 Fifth Assessment Report states that “Emissions of CO2 
from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes contribute about 78& of the total 
GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions increase from 1970 to 2010.”3 Whereas energy systems 
                                               
1 Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987). 
2 “United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992),” United Nations, last modified 
May 23, 1997, accessed November 11, 2018, http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html. 
3 O. Edenhofer et al., eds., “Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate 
Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
 
 
2 
fueled by the combustion fossil fuels release immense amounts of GHG emissions into 
the atmosphere, renewable energy systems, .  
A report released by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 
October 2018 states that the most important step that the international community must 
take to address the acceleration of climate change is to confront existing unsustainable 
energy systems.4 Thus, countries have increasingly looked to renewable energy 
technologies as the effects of climate change become more catastrophic: the Renewable 
Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, which tracks renewable energy policies 
worldwide, reported that the number of countries with either a renewable energy target 
increased from 45 in 2010 to 179 in 2017.5  
As the impetus to expand global renewable energy resources grows, renewable 
energy technologies are simultaneously becoming feasible for all, rather than only 
developed, countries. The term “sustainable energy” has become paramount in the push 
for sustainable development. While widely defined, sustainable energy sources “are 
affordable, safe, and available in sufficient quantity to enable continued economic and 
social development while promoting environmental stewardship.”6 Energy sources that 
are commonly considered sustainable are wind, solar, hydro, geothermal, and biomass. A 
                                                                                                                                            
on Climate Change (Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 5. 
4 Coral Davenport, “Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040,” The New 
York Times, October 15, 2018, sec. Climate, accessed November 14, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climate-report-2040.html. 
5 Renewables 2005 Global Status Report (Washington, DC, USA and Paris, France: Worldwatch Institute 
and Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, 2005), 19; Renewables 2018 Global Status 
Report (Paris, France: REN21 Secretariat, 2018), 19. 
6 Building a Sustainable Energy Future (National Science Board, April 10, 2009), 9, accessed November 2, 
2018, https://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2009/comments_se_report.pdf. 
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number of other terms are used to refer to sustainable energy sources, such as low-carbon 
and renewable sources. 
Renewable energy technologies are especially critical considering steadily-rising 
demand for electricity worldwide. With rapid population growth, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates in the World Energy 
Outlook 2018 under its New Policies Scenario that global energy demand is set to 
increase by more than 25% by 2040.7 The report also states that as solar photovoltaic 
energy becomes more competitive, its installed capacity will eclipse that of wind before 
2025, hydropower around 2030, and coal before 2040. Additionally, some models project 
that coal has seen its heyday; under the New Policies Scenario, “a rising tide of 
electricity, renewables, and efficiency improvements stems growth in coal 
consumption.”8 
In order for the international community to successfully shift away from fossil fuel 
energy sources towards renewable options, significant resources must be allocated 
towards the process of energy transitions. While there are multiple terms often used in 
conjunction with energy transition, such as sustainability or low-carbon transition, energy 
transition will be defined as “a change in the state of an energy system as opposed to a 
change in individual energy technology or fuel source.”9 The field of energy transitions 
encompasses a wide swath of intersecting disciplines, pulling from social, economic, 
environmental, technological, and cultural perspectives. This research was borne out of 
                                               
7 World Energy Outlook 2018: Executive Summary (International Energy Agency, November 2018), 1. 
8 Ibid., 3. 
9 Arnulf Grubler, Charlie Wilson, and Gregory Nemet, “Apples, Oranges, and Consistent Comparisons of 
the Temporal Dynamics of Energy Transitions,” Energy Research & Social Science 22 (December 1, 
2016): 18. 
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studying energy transitions mainly in developed, Western nations, with a focus on entire 
system transitions. Research on the dynamics of long-term shifts in society’s use of 
energy resources has been ongoing since at least the 1960s.10 
Academia discussing the process of energy transitions incorporates extensive theories 
on topics such as sociotechnical change, technology diffusion, and energy transitions 
more broadly. These theories parse out actors involved in transitions and the dynamics 
governing their actions in different ways, assigning agency to a variety of stakeholders 
from government to the private sector. 
Yet even though the international community has reached a consensus on the 
importance of shifting the makeup of global energy systems away from fossil fuels and 
towards renewables, there is a notable lack of progress, especially in developing 
countries. Energy transitions have been successfully completed in developed nations with 
ample technical and economic resources; all countries in the Group of 20 (G20) had, as of 
2017, implemented policies supporting power generation from large-scale renewable 
energy systems.11 There is no dearth of knowledge and technical expertise regarding the 
necessary processes to implement renewable energy systems; the technology and 
innovations are confirmed to work. Rather, a lack of understanding of the factors not 
merely technical impedes the successful diffusion of renewable energy systems: “While 
several authors point to the central importance of understanding the political and socio-
cultural dimensions to the technological transition taking place across developing 
                                               
10 Aleh Cherp et al., “Integrating Techno-Economic, Socio-Technical and Political Perspectives on 
National Energy Transitions: A Meta-Theoretical Framework,” Energy Research & Social Science 37 
(March 1, 2018): 176. 
11 IRENA, Opportunities to Accelerate National Energy Transitions through Enhanced Deployment of 
Renewables, (Report to the G20 Energy Transitions Working Group) (Abu Dhabi: International Renewable 
Energy Agency, 2018), 15. 
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countries, few authors have explored these aspects in empirical depth.”12 Considering that 
empirical analysis has been primarily in terms of technology and economics, “[w]ork on 
the political aspects . . . is almost non-existent, save for a handful of contributions dealing 
with energy, climate change, and development more broadly.”13 A lack of empirical 
evidence regarding the policy and societal processes necessary to facilitate low carbon 
technology transfer has resulted in “policy rhetoric on low carbon technology . . . 
fail[ing] to reflect the reality of how technology transfer can be achieved.”14  
Many have found that frameworks originally constructed to analyze ongoing societal 
transitions in Western, developed nations fall short of sufficiently accounting for the 
unique variables and challenges faced by developing countries.15 Developing countries 
across the globe are in the process of implementing their own renewable energy systems, 
and must navigate a myriad of competing actors, interests, and policy realities. Research 
on transitions in developing countries has substantially grown in the past ten years, 
specifically in Asian and African countries, such as India, China, South Africa, and 
Tanzania.16  
One of such countries attempting to shift the makeup of its energy system towards 
renewable sources is the central-Asian nation of Mongolia. The ongoing energy transition 
in Mongolia is but a microcosm of a larger shift in development towards ensuring that as 
                                               
12 David Ockwell et al., “The Uptake and Diffusion of Solar Power in Africa: Socio-Cultural and Political 
Insights on a Rapidly Emerging Socio-Technical Transition,” Energy Research & Social Science 44 
(October 1, 2018): 123. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Mahesh Sugathan and Muthukumara S. Mani, “The Role of Trade and Investment in Accelerating Clean 
Energy Diffusion: Private-Sector Views from South Asia,” in Low-Carbon Technology Transfer: From 
Rhetoric to Reality, ed. David G. Ockwell and Alexandra Mallett, First. (London: Routledge, 2012), 5. 
15 Anna J. Wieczorek, “Sustainability Transitions in Developing Countries: Major Insights and Their 
Implications for Research and Policy,” Environmental Science & Policy 84 (June 1, 2018): 204–216. 
16 Ibid., 211. 
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energy system interventions are undertaken in developing countries, they take into 
account two underlying considerations: development and climate.17 There has been little 
research done on the diffusion of renewable energy technologies in Mongolia in 
particular, specifically using the methods and frameworks common for analyzing energy 
transitions. Mongolia is classified by the World Bank as a lower middle-income country; 
electricity in Mongolia is primarily generated by coal fired power plants constructed in 
the mid-1900s during Mongolia’s Soviet rule. 18 These power plants are unsustainable, 
and discussions to replace them have been ongoing for decades.19 
According to Mongolia’s National Statistics Office, the population of Mongolia in 
2017 population was 3,177,899 across Mongolia’s 603,909 square miles, making it one 
of the least densely populated (by some accounts, the least densely populated) countries 
in the world.20 Out of the total population, 1,462,973 are estimated to live in Ulaanbaatar, 
the capital of Mongolia.21 The rest of the population is primarily nomadic, residing across 
the country throughout Mongolia’s 21 aimags (provinces). 
For Mongolia in particular, undertaking an energy transition towards renewable 
energy systems is pragmatic. In 2001, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Natural 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) released the “Wind Energy Resource Atlas of 
Mongolia,” detailing the wind resources in all provinces in Mongolia as well as potential 
                                               
17 Laurence Delina, “Multilateral Development Banking in a Fragmented Climate System: Shifting 
Priorities in Energy Finance at the Asian Development Bank,” International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics; Dordrecht 17, no. 1 (2017): 75. 
18 “Mongolia | Data,” World Bank Data, accessed October 3, 2018, 
https://data.worldbank.org/country/mongolia. 
19 Third National Communication of Mongolia Under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (Ulaanbaatar: Ministry of Environment and Tourism, May 2018). 
20 “Mongolia,” Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, accessed November 4, 2018, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html. 
21 Үндэсний Статистикийн Хороо, “Хүн Ам,” Үндэсний Статистикийн Хороо, accessed December 
15, 2018, http://1212.mn/Stat.aspx?LIST_ID=976_L03. 
 
 
7 
sites for prospective wind energy projects. Sponsored by the DOE and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID), the Atlas was meant to “help accelerate the 
large-scale use of wind energy technologies in Mongolia.”22 The NREL found that about 
10% of Mongolia (equivalent to 160,000 km2) has “good-to-excellent wind potential for 
utility scale applications” (Figure 1).23 NREL estimates Mongolia’s total renewable 
 
energy potential to be 2.6 terawatts (TW), with a potential electricity output from the 
country’s solar and wind resources combined of 15,000 terawatt-hours (TWh) per year. 
This output would be “enough to meet the total electricity demand of neighbouring China 
                                               
22 D Elliott et al., Wind Energy Resource Atlas of Mongolia (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
2001), 1. 
23 Ibid., x. 
Fig. 1. Wind electric potential of Mongolia (Wind Energy Resource Atlas of Mongolia, 2001). 
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in 2030.”24 Additionally, while Mongolia’s experience with large-scale renewable energy 
systems is limited, small-scale systems (such as standalone solar panels) exist across the 
country, particularly in rural and nomadic households.25  
Increased utilization of renewable energy sources is advantageous to Mongolia for 
multiple reasons. Mongolia has been dramatically affected by climate change. A study by 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) found that under the “business-as-usual (BAU) 
scenario in which current patterns of development continue,” Mongolia will be the 
country most severely affected in terms of percentage loss of annual gross domestic 
product (GDP) due to climate change.26 With climate change, both the magnitude and 
frequency of extreme weather events will likely increase; these events include both 
droughts and dzuds, which are “[e]xtreme weather event[s] or condition[s] that can be 
caused by sudden heavy snowfall, long-lasting or frequent snowfall, extreme cold or ice, 
or storms that cause often massive livestock deaths from hunger, exhaustion, and cold.”27 
Herders also report experiencing other effects of climate change, such as overall 
decreases in precipitation, including the earlier melting of snow; decreases in both 
biodiversity and the number of pasture plant species; and the drying up of rivers, lakes 
and springs.28 
For the Mongolian government, developing renewable energy technologies advances 
multiple policy priorities, such as increasing access to electricity, bolstering the country’s 
                                               
24 Yong Chen, Gürbüz Gönül, and Makhbal Tumenjargal, Mongolia: Renewables Readiness Assessment, 
2016, XIV. 
25 “Projects: Renewable Energy for Rural Access Project (REAP),” World Bank, last modified 2013, 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P099321/renewable-energy-rural-access-project-reap?lang=en. 
26 Michael Westphal, Economics of Climate Change in East Asia (Asian Development Bank, 2013), 154. 
27 Asian Development Bank, Making Grasslands Sustainable in Mongolia: Adapting to Climate and 
Environmental Change (Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2013), x. 
28 Ibid. 
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sustainability, mitigating hazards existing from the current reliance on coal, and 
positioning Mongolia as a serious participant within the growing global renewable energy 
market.  
This paper will analyze Mongolia’s ongoing energy transition using socio-technical 
theory, specifically, the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP). The literature review will 
discuss ongoing societal discussions about sustainable development and the undertaking 
of energy transitions, as well as socio-technical frameworks commonly drawn on to 
analyze such transitions. Chapter II will explore the application of the MLP to developing 
countries’ energy transitions in particular, noting the theory’s shortcomings in describing 
these transitions and looking at proposals to make the MLP more accommodating. 
Chapters III through V will employ the MLP to examine Mongolia’s ongoing energy 
transition towards renewable energy systems and additionally consider discrepancies 
between Mongolia’s own experiences and the trajectory described by the MLP. Finally, 
Chapter VI will supplement information in previous chapters by introducing data 
collected from surveys disseminated in locations throughout Mongolia. 
Methodology 
Research for this thesis was conducted primarily using online and print resources. 
One of the main limitations for this thesis was the limited availability of online and up-to-
date resources on the status and details of Mongolia’s ongoing energy transition. In order 
to account for these informational gaps, in-person surveys and interviews were 
additionally conducted in Mongolia in two phases—May 2017 and March 2019. The 
survey process, which took place in May 2017, is discussed in Chapter VI. Interviews 
were conducted in both May 2017 and March 2019. The second phase of interviews were 
 
 
10 
conducted in Ulaanbaatar from March 19, 2019 to March 22, 2019. Interviewees were 
identified with assistance from employees from the School for International Training, as 
well as prior connections established during the first interview phase. Survey and 
interview (in May 2017) research was approved by the Local Review Board. Interviews 
conducted in March 2019 were exempt from review by the Institutional Review Board at 
Claremont McKenna College.  
 
 
11 
Chapter I: Literature Review 
The question of how to achieve “sustainable development” has posed a monumental 
challenge for the international community since the term was initially defined in 1987. At 
the forefront of this challenge are questions regarding the relative responsibility, 
obligation, and action of each actor in the international community towards achieving the 
elusive goal of sustainable development.  
The international community has attempted for decades to unite for the purpose of 
facilitating “development.” At the Millennium Summit in 2000, members of the UN 
adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which sought overall to reduce 
extreme poverty worldwide by 2015.29 Following the conclusion of the Summit, the goals 
specified in the Declaration became known as the eight Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs): to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, 
promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal 
health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental 
sustainability, and form a global partnership for development.30 
Considering that the time period established for the MDGs ended in 2015, the UN 
decided in 2012 to develop post-2015 goals to build on the MDGs, which prompted the 
formation and adoption of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. The 
SDGs aim to encompass the multi-faceted nature of sustainable development as an 
overarching target—rather than being centered around a focus of ending extreme poverty, 
the goals call for implementing strategies to improve and address healthcare, inequality, 
                                               
29 United Nations General Assembly, “A/RES/55/2 ‘United Nations Millenium Declaration’” (United 
Nations, September 18, 2000). 
30 “United Nations Conferences, Meetings and Events: Millennium Summit,” United Nations, accessed 
April 23, 2019, https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/millennium_summit.shtml. 
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infrastructure, economic growth, environmental challenges, and more, recognizing that 
these strategies must be highly interconnected.31 
The interconnectedness of sustainable development issues demands a corresponding 
interconnectedness amongst engaged actors. For a solution to be implemented, it must be 
both approved and forged by not only all levels of government, but the private sector, 
civil society, and the general populous as well. Actors within transitions can include 
community members, the media, officials at every level of government, civil society 
groups, and advisory bodies, all of which are motivated by not just “cost-benefit 
calculations but also entrenched beliefs, conflicting values, competing interests, unequal 
resources, and complex social relations.”32 The vast number and relative position of 
stakeholders means that in addition to the diffusion of new technologies, successful 
implementation of low-carbon technologies involves “changes in user practices, cultural 
discourses, and broader political struggles.” 33 There is widespread contention between 
relevant actors as to best practices for implementing low-carbon solutions, which is 
exacerbated by the knowledge that technologies will only be successfully adopted if they 
both “successfully harness technical principles” and align with relevant social norms.34 
An additional challenge is posed by the existential motivation driving many 
sustainable development processes, in particular, energy transitions. Due to the 
underlying intent of mitigating climate change (which demands high levels of 
coordination) driving low-carbon transitions, such transitions are purposive, or goal-
                                               
31 United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goals,” Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 
accessed April 23, 2019, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs. 
32 Frank W. Geels et al., “The Socio-Technical Dynamics of Low-Carbon Transitions,” Joule 1, no. 3 
(2017): 463. 
33 Ibid., 464.  
34 Ibid.; Sugathan and Mani, “The Role of Trade and Investment in Accelerating Clean Energy Diffusion: 
Private-Sector Views from South Asia,” 10.  
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oriented, rather than emergent, or uncoordinated, as historical transitions have been.35 
This means that actors involved already have some sort of pre-determined vision as to 
what the transition should accomplish, which due to the large number of actors involved, 
can result in tension between opposing agendas. 
That sustainable energy transitions are often initiated as a means to mitigate the 
effects of climate change also adds a unique dimension of temporal pressure to the 
transitions. This precludes many processes involved in transitions, including low-carbon 
technology transfer, from happening at the pace of natural market and innovation 
processes.36 Historically, energy transitions are considered to take decades, potentially 
even longer than a century, to fully unfold.37  While the timeline of a transition highly 
depends on the relative definitions and position of whomever is defining the transition, it 
is commonly accepted that society’s transition to clean energy sources must happen at a 
pace far more rapid than we have traditionally been accustomed to.38  
Energy transitions are also hindered by the economic nature of the climate change 
problem, in that the responsibility for dealing with climate change is a tragedy of the 
commons. The ultimate goal of low-carbon technology transfer is to deliver a public good 
                                               
35 Adrian Smith, Andy Stirling, and Frans Berkhout, “The Governance of Sustainable Socio-Technical 
Transitions,” Research Policy 34, no. 10 (December 1, 2005): 1501–1502. 
36 Sugathan and Mani, “The Role of Trade and Investment in Accelerating Clean Energy Diffusion: 
Private-Sector Views from South Asia,” 7. 
37 Arnulf Grubler, “Energy Transitions Research: Insights and Cautionary Tales,” Energy Policy 50, 
Special Section: Past and Prospective Energy Transitions - Insights from History (November 1, 2012): 11. 
38 Benjamin K. Sovacool, “How Long Will It Take? Conceptualizing the Temporal Dynamics of Energy 
Transitions,” Energy Research & Social Science 13, Energy Transitions in Europe: Emerging Challenges, 
Innovative Approaches, and Possible Solutions (March 1, 2016): 202, 211. 
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(such as climate change mitigation), but the transfer itself must be incentivized “in the 
absence of an obvious market.”39  
Additional barriers to sustainable energy transitions in developing countries exist 
beyond those realized by the nature of the climate change problem. Barriers posed by any 
traditional energy transition are exacerbated by the limited institutional capacity of many 
developing countries, requiring technology transfer to simultaneously occur both 
horizontally (between countries) and vertically (from research stages to implementation 
or research and development), whereas for many developed countries, this transfer would 
occur only vertically.40 Other broad categories of barriers include market structure, 
infrastructure, financial, institutional, interaction, technological, behavioral, political, and 
more.41 Many scholars have devoted attention to identifying both barriers to renewable 
energy diffusion and potential strategies for overcoming these barriers.42  
 
I.1 Theory on Transitions 
Given that the challenges posed by the prospect of sustainable development are so 
broad, scholars have turned to theoretical frameworks to help dissect and clarify the 
ongoing dynamics present in such challenges. This allows sustainable development to be 
viewed not only as a nebulous, ideological ideal, but rather as a logical process that can 
be approached systematically and analytically wherein society is transitioning from using 
incumbent to novel systems. Transitions have been widely studied; a transition can be 
                                               
39 Sugathan and Mani, “The Role of Trade and Investment in Accelerating Clean Energy Diffusion: 
Private-Sector Views from South Asia,” 7. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ingrid Mignon and Anna Bergek, “System- and Actor-Level Challenges for Diffusion of Renewable 
Electricity Technologies: An International Comparison,” Journal of Cleaner Production 128 (August 1, 
2016): 107. 
42 J.P. Painuly, “Barriers to Renewable Energy Penetration; a Framework for Analysis,” Renewable Energy 
24 (2001): 73–89. 
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defined as a “radical, structural change of a societal (sub)system that is the result of a co-
evolution of economic, cultural, technological, ecological and institutional developments 
at different scale-levels.”43 Transitions are required to address persistent problems 
“related to systemic failures that have crept into our societal systems, which, contrary to 
market failures, cannot be corrected by the market or conventional policies.”44 Due to the 
fact that “[t]ransitions involve mutually coherent changes in practices and structures,” the 
nature of transitions is both complex and comprehensive.45 Literature on sustainability 
transitions has increased as efforts to identify the best pathways towards addressing 
social, economic, and ecological challenges have increased. The multi-faceted nature of 
these challenges requires an approach that fully takes into account all parts of the existing 
systems that society seeks to change. Moreover, these systems themselves are complex—
transitions aim to uproot existing structures related to energy, healthcare, education, food, 
mobility, and more.46 
The complexity of transition processes has led to the development of many 
approaches to describe the interrelated parts of transitions. A commonly-used 
overarching framework to describe transitions is the multi-phase concept, which is 
derived from complex adaptive systems theory.47 This framework describes transitions in 
four phases—predevelopment, take-off, acceleration, and stabilization (Figure 2). In the 
predevelopment phase, the status quo does not change visibly but there are changes in the 
background to the former state of equilibrium. The take-off phase occurs when the “state 
                                               
43 John Grin, Jan Rotmans, and Johan Schot, Transitions to Sustainable Development: New Directions in 
the Study of Long Term Transformative Change (New York: Routledge, 2010), 108. 
44 Ibid., 108. 
45 Ibid., 3. 
46 Johan Schot and Laur Kanger, “Deep Transitions: Emergence, Acceleration, Stabilization and 
Directionality,” Research Policy 47, no. 6 (July 1, 2018): 1045. 
47 Grin, Rotmans, and Schot, Transitions to Sustainable Development, 4. 
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of the system begins to shift.”48 In the breakthrough phase, change to the system begins 
to be visible; these changes can be socio-cultural, economic, ecological, and institutional. 
This phase involves learning, diffusion, and embedding processes as well. Finally, the 
stabilization phase occurs when “the speed of social change decreases and a new dynamic  
equilibrium is reached.”49 
Fig. 2. The different phases of a transition (Adapted from Rotmans et al., 2001:17). 
In addition to the multi-phase concept, socio-technical theory has also been applied to 
explain transitions. The concept of a socio-technical system has been used by many since 
at least the mid-twentieth century to describe systems, such as those aforementioned, 
whose operation relies on more than purely technology: “technologies do not fulfil 
societal functions on their own . . . Only in association with human agency, social 
                                               
48 Jan Rotmans, René Kemp, and Marjolein van Asselt, “More Evolution than Revolution: Transition 
Management in Public Policy,” Foresight 3, no. 1 (February 1, 2001): 17. 
49 Ibid. 
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structures and organisations do artefacts fulfil functions.”50 Socio-technical systems are 
those that, in addition to technology, also take into account socioware, or how societal 
elements factor into the development of a technology. Socio-technical systems consider 
both technology and the institutions necessary to facilitate successful diffusion and use of 
said technology.51 Sustainability transitions are often discussed as a subset of socio-
technical transitions, as they describe the processes through which established socio-
technical systems either evolve or are replaced by more sustainable systems.52 
Energy systems are considered socio-technical due to the fact that while energy 
infrastructure is, at its core, a technological system, energy infrastructure does not operate 
autonomously, and requires constant oversight and maintenance from government and 
industry.53 Due to the unsustainability of historically-utilized fossil-fuel energy systems, 
energy is often at the forefront of many conversations regarding sustainability transitions. 
In the case of a socio-technical transition from a fossil-fuel reliant energy system to a 
renewable energy system, the persistent problem to be addressed is society’s reliance on 
fossil fuel-driven energy systems. 
Theory on socio-technical transitions is rooted historically in concepts from 
evolutionary economics, sociology, and science and technology studies (STS).54 Socio-
technical transitions are co-evolving (innovative technologies must be developed, put into 
                                               
50 F. W. Geels, Technological Transitions and System Innovations: A Co-Evolutionary and Socio-Technical 
Analysis (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005), 1. 
51 Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 465; Arie Rip and René Kemp, “Technological 
change,” in Human choice and climate change. Vol. II, Resources and Technology, 1998, 331. 
52 Jochen Markard, Rob Raven, and Bernhard Truffer, “Sustainability Transitions: An Emerging Field of 
Research and Its Prospects,” Research Policy 41, no. 6, Special Section on Sustainability Transitions (July 
1, 2012): 956. 
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use, adopted, and ultimately societally embedded), multi-actor, radical (in terms of the 
innovation required, not the speed of the transition), long-term, and macroscopic.55  
Socio-technical theory is predicated on historical descriptions detailing the interaction 
between technology and society, established through STS.56 The process in which 
technology is developed is also multi-faceted, and was described by Bruno Latour as 
“heterogeneous engineering”: not only must technology be physically developed, but the 
process also involves mobilizing resources, creating social networks, constructing 
markets and necessary regulatory regimes, and developing visions.57 A similar term, 
coined by Thomas Hughes, is “seamless web,” used to further establish that the evolution 
processes for society and technology are not separable—the process is one of 
coevolution.58 
Beyond socio-technical theories, other disciplines have contributed to the field of 
energy transitions by proposing alternative frameworks. In addition to socio-technical, 
frameworks are also categorized as techno-economic or political.59 The main differences 
between these frameworks revolve around the academic disciplines that ground each—
for techno-economic, this is economics, Earth sciences, and engineering; for socio-
technical, this is evolutionary economics, history, and sociology; for political, this is 
                                               
55 Ibid., 12–13. 
56 Ibid., 13. 
57 Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
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political science.60 Others advocate for examining energy transitions as other processes 
(such as a geographical process), yet the main domains through which energy transitions 
have been examined are those aforementioned.61 
 
I.2 Socio-Technical Heuristic Frameworks 
Within socio-technical frameworks, four are primarily studied in the context of socio-
technical transitions: the multi-level perspective (MLP), strategic niche management 
(SNM), technological innovation systems (TIS), and transition management (TM).62 
Across these four frameworks, a central concept is that of the socio-technical regime and 
presence of niche developments.63  
I.2.1 Multi-Level Perspective  
The MLP was developed in the latter half of the twentieth century by scholars seeking 
to form a bridge between STS and evolutionary economics.64 The framework describes 
interactions between three levels—the “niche” level, “regime” level, and “landscape” 
level—and aims to explain “how incumbent (and unsustainable) technological regimes 
can be ‘destabilised’ through ‘niche’ developments.”65 Levels of the MLP constitute a 
nested hierarchy: niches are embedded in regimes, which are embedded in the landscapes  
                                               
60 Ibid., 179–181. 
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Energy Policy 53 (February 1, 2013): 331–340. 
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(Figure 3). 
                    
Fig. 3. Multiple levels in a nested hierarchy (Geels, 2002:1261). 
In order for niche innovations to break through, changes in the landscape often exert 
pressure on existing regimes, eventually opening up the regime (Figure 4). This can 
happen as a result of multiple scenarios, such as a change in user preferences, increased 
negative externalities from the expansion of existing regimes, society perceiving existing 
regimes as threatening, internal technical problems within a regime, or if firms invest in 
innovation as a competitive strategy.66 
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Fig. 4. A dynamic multi-level perspective on transitions (Geels, 2002:1263). 
I.2.2 Strategic Niche Management 
Strategic niche management is “a concentrated effort to develop protected spaces for 
certain applications of a new technology.”67 Protected spaces allow technologies to 
evolve from simply being ideas or suggestions into usable and fully-developed entities. 
SNM advocates for three internal processes that must occur for the successful 
development of a technological innovation: articulation of necessary technological and 
institutional changes, learning processes (including assessing economic, social, and 
technical feasibility; anticipated gains; alignment with existing systems; anticipated 
effects), and the building of social networks to constitute a constituency of supporters for 
the product who are able to facilitate necessary systematic shifts. A fourth external 
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process includes stimulating further development of the niche technology, as well as of 
complementary technologies and policies necessary to support the niche innovation.68 
The utility of SNM arises from its ability to assess the state of niches to subsequently 
inform policymaking, and the framework has been found useful for analyzing the 
dynamics of technological cases.69 Considering the highly technical nature of energy 
systems, SNM is frequently applied in energy transition analysis.70 
I.2.3 Technological Innovation Systems 
The Technological innovation systems (TIS) framework is one subset of the larger 
group of frameworks on innovation systems. The first of these was the concept of 
national systems of innovations, rooted in theory on evolutionary economics.71 The 
concept of innovation systems  refers to all factors involved in innovation processes; “all 
important economic, social, political, organizational, institutional, and other factors that 
influence the development, diffusion, and use of innovations.”72 The efficacy of 
technology transfer is largely influenced by national systems of innovation, or “networks 
of institutions that initiate, modify, import, and diffuse new technologies.”73 
Technological innovation systems differ from national systems in that, rather than 
referring to the entirety of the national system, they refer to “specific techno-industrial 
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areas.”74 Technological systems both foster the development of niche innovations and 
support existing technologies.75 Rather than being used to describe the overarching and 
broad nature of transitions, TIS has traditionally focused on analyzing specific 
technological systems for the purpose of informing policymaking.76 
I.2.4 Transition Management 
The transition management (TM) framework is used to further structure the 
governance processes of ongoing transitions with a long-term normative goal of 
sustainable development.77 The MLP serves as the underlying theory that TM further 
builds on in order to formulate a comprehensive management strategy. It is a “process-
oriented philosophy that balances coherence with uncertainty and complexity” born out 
of insights from governance approaches and complex systems theory.78 Rather than 
providing an explanation for a transition, transition management aims to provide tools to 
work towards a transition more generally, with the assumption that the transition will 
eventually offer collective benefits. The process involves regular re-evaluation of the 
goals and practices fueling the transition.79 In addition to the MLP, transition 
management utilizes the multi-phase concept describing four phases of transitions: 
predevelopment, take-off, breakthrough, and stabilization.80 TM was introduced in 2001 
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in the fourth Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NMP4) as official government 
policy. Rather than set explicit goals, the NMP4 outlined sweeping societal ambitions, 
recognizing that achieving these ambitions would require fundamental system changes 
and transitions.81 The plan utilized the TM cycle (Figure 5), which details four 
governance arenas: strategic, tactical, operational, and reflexive.82 
                              
Fig. 5. Transition management cycle (Loorbach, 2010:173).  
 
I.3 Multi-Level Perspective 
Out of the four aforementioned socio-technical frameworks, the MLP will be used to 
examine Mongolia’s ongoing energy transition. This selection is apt because in contrast 
to TIS and SNM, the MLP does not place heightened emphasis on the development of 
niche innovations; in a similar vein, the specific bottom-up development of niche 
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technologies is not an integral part of Mongolia’s transition. The MLP was also chosen 
given that many more studies use the MLP than transition management, which has been 
additionally criticized for its Eurocentric slant and subsequent incompatibility with 
factors common in developing contexts.83 
Rather than focusing solely on a singular aspect of society and its contribution to 
transitions, the MLP reflects the diversity and multidisciplinarity of structures within 
socio-technical systems. Transitions are both brought about and hindered by techno-
economic, business, political, social, and cultural factors. The MLP has been utilized to 
analyze historical and ongoing transitions across many socio-technical systems, such as 
the British transition from sailing ships to steamships and America’s transitions from 
piston engine aircraft to jetliners as well as from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles.84  
I.3.1 Landscape Level 
The first level of the MLP is the landscape level, “an external structure or context for 
interactions of actors.”85 Due to the exogenous and overarching structure of the 
landscape, it is “beyond the direct influence of regime and niche actors.”86 The landscape 
encompasses both literal landscape traits—such as physical geography, available 
resources, and climate—as well as more theoretical components, such as broad societal 
                                               
83 It is important to note that similar criticism has been leveraged against all of the aforementioned socio-
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trends, economic cycles, and political constellations.87 There are no actors unique to the 
landscape level; rather, landscape changes arise as a result of either independent 
occurrences or actions by regime and niche actors.88 
Considering the scope of the landscape, it undergoes change at a much slower pace 
than regimes.89 Often, factors that contribute to landscape shifts are described temporally. 
There are factors that change either slowly or not at all (i.e. the climate), factors that 
change in the long-term (i.e. German industrialization), and rapid exogenous shocks (i.e. 
oil price fluctuations, wars). Altogether, these factors cannot be influenced in the short-
term; rather, they combine to make up a larger external context that is the landscape 
level.90 
I.3.2 Regime Level 
A technological regime is “the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of 
engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and 
procedures, ways of handling relevant artifacts and persons, ways of defining problems—
all of them embedded in institutions and infrastructures.”91 Socio-technical regimes, 
specifically, refer to the rules that various social groups abide by, and are responsible for 
the stability of a sociotechnical system.92 Regimes describe the institutions, paradigms, 
practices, economics, and dominant structures specific to a technology, as well as to a 
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societal function or ecosystem.93 At the regime level is where incumbent94 actors, 
technologies, and systems operate. The regime can be influenced by changes both at the 
niche level or the landscape level. Socio-technical regimes make up the more intangible 
components of an overarching incumbent socio-technical system, which additionally 
includes tangible components such as “technologies, industries, supply chains, 
consumption patterns, policies, and infrastructures.”95 
Regime change is driven by multiple factors at a time interacting with one another. 
While each of these factors change relatively autonomously, their collective evolution 
results in changes in the existing regime (Figure 6).96 Table 1 further explains potential 
drivers of regime  
 
                                               
93 Verbong and Loorbach, Governing the Energy Transition, 9. 
94 An incumbent firm is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Economics as “[a] firm which is already 
operating in a market.” 
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96 Grin, Rotmans, and Schot, Transitions to Sustainable Development, 21.  
Fig. 6. Co-evolution between regime components (Grin, Rotmans, & Schot, 2011:21 [adapted from Geels, 2004: 912]). 
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tensions, demonstrating how these tensions can arise from any part of society. Existing 
regimes may begin to fracture if, alongside the exacerbation of regime tensions, niche-
innovations are sufficiently developed to the point where they are able to compete with 
incumbent structures.97 
Table 1  
Drivers of regime tensions (Adapted from Geels et al., 2017:467). 
Societal sphere Drivers of regime tensions 
Techno-economic technical failures, disruption of infrastructures, accumulating negative 
externalities (e.g., CO2 emissions)  
Business shrinking markets, economic difficulties in incumbent industries, loss 
of confidence in existing technologies and business models, 
reorientation toward alternatives  
Social disagreement and fracturing of social networks, defection of key social 
groups from the regime  
Political eroding political influence of incumbent industries, declining political 
support, removal of supportive policies, introduction of disruptive 
policies  
Cultural negative cultural discourses undermine the legitimacy of existing 
regimes (e.g., coal and climate change, diesel cars, and air quality)  
 
Barriers to change. That regimes are upheld by numerous interlocking rules means 
that niche innovations are only able to break through incumbent structures if these rules 
are either weakened or altered. These rules can be separated into three categories: 
regulative, normative, and cognitive.98 Examples of regulative rules include regulations, 
laws, and standards; normative rules include behavioral norms, values, and role 
relationships; cognitive rules include guiding principles, user practices, market 
perceptions, goals, and problem definitions. These rules interlock and reinforce one 
another, accounting for what is classified as “lock-in” of socio-technical systems.99 For 
example, engineers and designers are bound by cognitive rules and routines towards 
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existing directions, causing them to ignore extraneous developments.100 Similarly, 
organizations resist changes because of developing “webs of interdependent relationships 
with buyers, suppliers, and financial backers . . . and patterns of culture, norms, and 
ideology.”101 These dynamics can contribute to path dependence, wherein the outcomes 
of future and current states depends on previous states’ paths.102 
I.3.3 Niche Level 
Innovations at the niche level are characterized by their deviation from the incumbent 
system; examples include “a new behavioural practice (e.g. car sharing), a new 
technology (e.g. battery-electric vehicles), a new business model (e.g. energy service 
companies, or a combination of these.”103 Innovation that occurs at the niche level is of a 
different nature than innovation within an existing regime. Rather than the incremental 
innovation that may take place within existing energy regimes, niche level developments 
are often talked about in terms of necessitating “radical” or “breakthrough” 
innovations.104 Niches allow these radical innovations to be protected from existing 
market structures while they are still being developed.105 Niche innovations “gain a 
foothold in particular applications, geographical areas, or markets (e.g., the military), or 
with the help of targeted policy support.”106 Developments at the niche level can be 
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technological, but may also include novel policies implemented with the purpose of 
nurturing niche technologies. 
At the niche level, much of the structure that the regime level is characterized by is 
absent. The makeup of actors is constantly in flux, resulting in unstable networks where 
rules are imprecise and opaque. The maintenance of niches thus requires sustained effort 
from the actors involved to upkeep niche development.107 
Radical innovations, or novelties, can remain in niches for any duration of time 
depending on the existing regimes and landscapes; novelties often remain in niches for 
long periods of time. This can be for multiple reasons related to the existing regimes: 
novelties may require extensive technological development, dragging out the period of 
time until they are ready to be brought into the regime, the regime may be incompatible 
with the novelty, or “existing regime actors actively oppose niche-innovations,” leading 
to the imposition of barriers to prevent novelties from breaking through. The stability of 
existing regimes is also relevant—the more stable existing regimes are, the less likely 
novelties will be able to break through. All levels are important; “it is the alignment of 
developments—successful processes within the niche reinforced by changes at regime 
level and at the level of the sociotechnical landscape—which determine if a regime shift 
will occur.”108 
Similar to the number of potential pathways that can contribute to the formation of 
regime tensions, niche developments can gain momentum through many different 
avenues (Table 2).  
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Table 2 
Drivers of niche momentum (Geels et al., 2017:467). 
Societal sphere Drivers of endogenous niche momentum 
Techno-economic price/performance improvements as a result of R&D, learning by doing, 
scale economies, complementary technologies, and network externalities 
Business new entrants or incumbents from other sectors are more likely to drive 
radical innovation than traditional incumbents. Their success may lead 
to “innovation races” when other firms follow a first mover  
Social growing support coalitions and constituencies improve available skills, 
finance, and political clout  
Political advocacy coalitions lobby for policy changes that support the niche 
innovation such as subsidies and supportive regulations  
Cultural positive discourses and visions attract attention, create cultural 
enthusiasm, and increase socio-political legitimacy  
 
Barriers to change. Niche-innovations often face resistance from the existing regime 
structures, and their ability to break through is dependent largely on circumstances 
surrounding the regime, which is in turn dependent on landscape conditions. It is also 
possible that circumstances may position the regime to be open to the introduction of 
niche technologies; however, if niche-innovations are not fully developed, they will not 
be able to capitalize on this opening. The relationship between niche developments and 
existing regime structures can also inhibit break through. If niche-innovations are able to 
be incorporated into the incumbent structure, existing symbiotically, then they are able to 
be adopted regardless of a distinct opening in the regime.109 Niche-innovations can also 
be stunted if their development is not supported, either financially or ideologically, by 
champion actors.  
I.3.4 Typology of Transitions 
Recognizing that transitions arise from many different circumstances as a result of 
variation within regimes and niche actors, as well as contextual landscape factors, Frank 
Geels and Johan Schot developed four pathways for socio-technical transitions: 
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transformation, technological substitution, reconfiguration, and de-alignment and re-
alignment.110 These pathways differ based on timing and the nature of interactions 
between the levels of the MLP. Each has different main actors, and pressure for change 
manifests at different levels depending on the involvement of these actors.  
In order to further delineate the dynamics of change that occur within each pathway, 
Geels and Schot utilize the typology for environmental change that Fernando Suarez and 
Rogelio Oliva propose. Using the attributes of frequency, amplitude, speed, and scope, 
five different classifications for environmental change are identified (Table 3). Geels and 
Schot use this typology to apply to the MLP; each pathway exhibits one or more of the 
types of change, which can occur at any level. 
Table 3 
Attributes of change and resulting typology (Suarez & Oliva, 2005:1022). 
Frequency Amplitude Speed Scope Type of environmental change 
Low Low Low Low Regular 
High Low High Low Hyperturbulence 
Low High High Low Specific shock 
Low High Low Low Disruptive 
Low High High High Avalanche 
 
Transformation. In the transformation pathway, moderate landscape changes 
(disruptive change) apply pressure to existing regime systems; however, niche-
innovations are not sufficiently developed to be able to take advantage of potential 
regime openings as a result of landscape pressure. Regime changes are initiated by 
incumbent actors responding to criticism voiced by outside groups.111 
Technological substitution. In this pathway, niche-innovations are developed 
sufficiently so that when enough landscape pressure is applied to the existing regime, 
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niche developments are able to penetrate and replace incumbent systems. This 
breakthrough is not possible without sufficient landscape changes—which typically 
occurs in the form of a specific shock, avalanche change, or disruptive change—and 
resulting pressure due to highly entrenched regime structures.  Rather than being 
developed by actors in the incumbent regime, niche-innovations are developed by 
outsiders, and receive minimal attention from incumbent actors, who do not feel 
threatened by the presence of niche-innovations.112  
Reconfiguration. In the reconfiguration pathway, niche-innovations do not necessarily 
clash with the existing regime. Instead, niche-innovations are symbiotic; the regime 
adopts these innovations to solve existing problems. Eventually, this adoption continues 
until the incumbent regime is reconfigured to account for the presence and utilization of 
the symbiotic innovations.113  
De-alignment and re-alignment. This pathway involves the collapse and erosion of 
the existing regime as a result of significant landscape change, to the point that actors 
lose faith in the incumbent systems. Niche-innovations are not necessarily sufficiently 
developed at the point of erosion; thus, multiple niche technologies may compete until 
one is identified as dominant. This dominant niche-innovation will eventually become the 
foundation that allows for the re-alignment of a new regime.114  
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Chapter II: Application of the MLP to Energy Transitions  
in the Global South 
 
The MLP has been consistently applied as a heuristic framework for socio-technical 
transitions, in particular, energy and low-carbon transitions, such as the German and 
Dutch electricity transition to renewables.115 Thus, as the impetus on developing 
countries to undertake energy transitions has grown, scholars have identified the MLP as 
a useful tool for analysis. Using the MLP as a guide, components of energy transitions in 
select case studies of developing countries will be discussed, as well as the applicability 
of the MLP to these transitions. Discrepancies between the application of the MLP to 
developed versus developing countries will also be identified and discussed. 
 
II.1 Landscape Level 
Whereas regime and niche developments in developed countries have historically 
contributed to patterns and circumstances at the landscape level, similar developments in 
the global South have been less present. Thus, the landscape context framing many 
developing countries’ energy transitions has been formed by actors and actions outside of 
the developing country’s direct sphere of influence. While the landscape level has 
traditionally been described as beyond the direct influence of actors, niche and regime 
actors involved in developing countries’ transitions are often motivated by deliberate 
efforts by international organizations to reconfigure normative policy priorities. In the 
1990s, for example, multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank pushed 
for developing countries to implement reforms for the liberalization of their energy 
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sectors.116 Similar dynamics are the result of other international efforts by organizations 
such as the UN and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, both of which have 
undertaken concerted efforts to educate and equip the public with information about 
climate change and sustainable development. Energy transitions may also be driven by 
landscape shifts that result from price fluctuations of particular energy sources, such as 
rising oil or coal prices.117  
 
II.2 Regime Level 
II.2.1 Drivers of Regime Tension 
Reflecting the holistic nature of socio-technical systems, regime change can be 
initiated by developments across any aspect of society. It is important to note that the 
characterization of incumbent regimes in the MLP is biased towards developing 
countries— often, these regimes have been in place for numerous decades at a minimum, 
and are therefore highly integrated not only within directly relevant aspects of society but 
society as a whole. Reliance on these regimes leads to entrenchment, resulting in path 
dependency and lock-in, and making it more challenging for niches to break through. 
Regimes in developed countries most often evolved from knowledge and capacity 
already present in said countries, or in countries with societally similar circumstances. 
The seminal MLP diagram (Figure 3) presents regimes as uniform systems. 
However, this presentation of regimes is inapplicable in many ways to developing 
countries. Regimes in developing countries are often composed of technologies diffused 
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not from the developing countries themselves, but rather developed countries. This 
diffusion results in widespread variations in the nature of these regimes depending on an 
individual country’s own domestic landscape context.118 As a result, regimes are often 
non-uniform, and are more likely to experience internal tensions. This non-uniformity 
also contributes to a different standard of regime stability:119 “The presupposition of a 
‘universal infrastructure ideal’ in [large technical systems] and [multi-level transitions] 
theories can help to explain their lack of traction for studies focused on the [global] 
South, where infrastructure is often characterized by ‘archipelagoes’ and disrepair or 
even dilapidation.120 
II.2.1.1 Technological 
Incumbent systems may experience technical difficulties as a result of aging 
technology or demand limitations, resulting in the need to pursue alternative system.121  
II.2.1.2 Markets and Finances 
Given rapid population growth and industrialization in developing countries, many 
are driven to explore renewable or sustainable energy systems as a result of increasing 
energy demand.122 Moreover, having a healthy economy allows a developing country 
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with may be appealing to international investors, paving the way for actors such as 
development banks or other countries to invest in alternative energy sources.123 
II.2.1.3 Political  
Domestic governments play a large role in incentivizing firms to produce renewable 
energy technology. Incentives can be multi-faceted and cultivated either directly or 
indirectly. Examples of government involvement are domestic renewable energy policies, 
subsidies, declaring a renewable energy target, trade-related incentives, and more.124 
Policies incentivizing the use of low-carbon technologies “can play a strong role in 
overcoming cost barriers and developing markets for new low carbon technologies.”125 
Governments can encourage a clean energy market in three ways: implementing policies 
that either directly or indirectly encourage the purchase of clean energy, as well as 
purchasing renewable energy directly.126 
II.2.1.4 Socio-Cultural  
Co-benefits—such as climate change mitigation and reduced air pollution—from 
utilizing sustainable energy sources can further incentivize governments to undertake 
energy transitions.127 Governments may seek to initiate energy transitions to address 
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systemic societal challenges, such as endemic poverty or widespread lack of access to 
electricity.128  
Also relevant are pre-existing relations between developing countries and the 
international community. A documented history of being open to international actors can 
prime a developing country to receive financial assistance from donors for further 
reforms and development projects: “Kenya’s adoption of neoliberal reforms in the energy 
sector has been rewarded by support from bilateral and multilateral donors, opening up 
opportunities for foreign capital to meet the shortfall in energy supply.”129 
The public’s increased ability to obtain information about new technologies and 
global trends has also contributed to the weakening of regimes. For instance, in Kenya, 
increased media attention on climate change has allowed the public to become more 
knowledgeable about the availability and benefits of clean technologies.130 
II.2.2 Barriers to Regime Change 
II.2.2.1 Political 
Because the MLP was initially criticized for failing to account for state autonomy and 
agency, the state as an autonomous actor has increasingly received attention through 
applications of the MLP. Yet this attention must be carefully applied to developing 
contexts, where states are often limited by institutional capacity and highly dependent on 
foreign aid. While these states are not powerless—in many cases they are still responsible 
for controlling electricity systems—“state capacity and autonomy to chart and pursue 
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lower-carbon pathways is shaped by their relations with various other actors and is 
unevenly distributed.”131 
Policymakers are also limited in their ability to affect change as a result of competing 
agenda priorities. Especially in developing countries, the prospect of sustainability is just 
one of many areas for societal growth. Policymakers’ primary motivation for 
implementing policies that accomplish climate change mitigation is rarely simply 
mitigation; rather, these actors are primarily driven by goals such as bolstering energy 
security, creating jobs, fostering new green industries, or increasing public revenue. 
Climate change mitigation is, at best, merely a co-benefit.132 
Even in countries with liberalized energy markets, regulations at the regime level can 
still act as barriers to burgeoning RE producers. Large electric utility companies will act 
to further enforce or regulate existing barriers to prevent RE producers from entering the 
market. In general, little research has been done on the effects of various regulatory 
regimes for developing countries’ RE industries.133 
The political climate of developing countries can also hinder regime change from 
taking place. For instance, in Ethiopia, geopolitical conflicts with bordering nations as 
well as internal political instability further perpetuates low levels of competition.134 
II.2.3.2 Socio-Cultural 
Incumbent regimes are also protected by existing societal attitudes, including 
society’s acceptance (or lack of) towards a new or emerging technology. Many barriers to 
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the successful incorporation of niche developments into the existing regime “can be 
considered as a manifestation of lack of social acceptance.”135 Increasingly, studies have 
been done on the role that social acceptance plays in diffusion. Studies in the 1980s 
showed that support at any level—be it from the public or crucial stakeholders—could 
not be taken for granted.136  
Social acceptance can be broken down into further categories, namely, socio-political 
acceptance, community acceptance, and market acceptance (Figure 7). 
 
Fig. 7. Diagram of social acceptance dimensions (Adapted from Hosseini, 2018). 
Socio-political acceptance refers to the broadest level of social acceptance and 
includes acceptance of technologies and policies by the public, key stakeholders, and 
policymakers. Results from years of opinion polls indicate that the majority of the public 
agrees with renewable energy concepts, leading many to think that worldwide social 
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acceptance of renewables is subsequently high. However, this is not the case; “[t]his 
positive overall picture for renewable energy has (mis)led policy makers to believe that 
social acceptance is not an issue.”137 
Community acceptance relates to how local stakeholders and community members 
accept renewable energy decisions. There are three components within community 
acceptance: procedural justice, distributional justice, and trust. Procedural justice 
concerns whether or not the decision-making process allows equal access to participation 
for all stakeholders, distributional justice concerns the distribution of costs and benefits 
among stakeholders, and trust is in terms of whether or not the local community trusts 
information regarding the implementation of renewable energy.138 The concept of trust is 
critical to the successful implementation of renewable energy projects.139 Within 
community acceptance is the concept of NIMBY-ism, which stands for “not in my 
backyard” and refers to the phenomenon that occurs when individuals support renewable 
energy on principle as long as it isn’t present in their own backyard.140 Theory on 
community acceptance also describes a U-shape pattern regarding individuals’ 
perceptions of renewable energy projects—acceptance is high during proposal and lead 
up stages, then dips once the logistical components are being carried out, and finally 
increases again once the project is fully in operation.141  
Market acceptance refers to how the market adopts an innovation. Market acceptance 
considers consumer, investor, and intra-firm acceptance, and is related to socio-political 
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acceptance due to the fact that as stakeholders, firms can influence the political process 
and political decisions made regarding renewable energy.142  
Cultivating public appeal for low-carbon technology transitions can also be 
challenging, as there is not always an obvious constituent base to support such 
transitions. Whereas other political policies can be associated with clearly defined 
benefits, the benefits of low-carbon transitions “are displaced in space and time from 
those who pay for them.”143 Roberts discusses the need to form coalitions to support low-
carbon transitions, considering that, as Newell and Paterson note, successful transitions 
“will have to be supported (financially and politically) by powerful fractions of capital 
with a stake in the success of such a project.”144   
 
II.3 Niche Level 
II.3.1 Drivers of Niche Momentum 
While the conceptual nature of operations at the niche level are unchanged for 
developing countries, a significant disparity arises in the actors who are primarily 
responsible for developing and nurturing niche-innovations. Within developing countries’ 
energy transitions, the niche level in particular is characterized by significant levels of 
involvement from exogenous and international actors.  
II.3.1.1 Technological 
For many developing countries, rather than being developed domestically from the 
ground up, niche technologies are often both fully developed and successfully operating 
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in developed countries at the time of transition, making traditional niche development 
obsolete. Instead, niche technologies are introduced and nurtured through processes such 
as technology transfer. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), technology transfer is defined as 
the broad set of processes covering the flows of knowledge, experience and 
equipment amongst different stakeholders such as governments, private sector 
entities, financial institutions, NGOs and research/educational institutions. The broad 
and inclusive term “transfer” encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology 
cooperation across and within countries. It comprises the process of learning to 
understand, utilize, and replicate the technology, including the capacity to choose it 
and adapt it to local conditions.145 
  
Technological learning refers to individuals’ and organizations’ accumulation of 
“technological knowledge and experience,” and results in the accumulation of 
technological capabilities.146 Technological learning is “not an automatic by-product of 
investments,” and can only occur under the right conditions, which must be facilitated by 
both the government and domestic firms.147 Looking at Thailand, it was found that 
“technological learning can, in the near future, reduce the cost of renewable electricity in 
emerging economics to a level that is close to competitiveness with fossil fuels,” and 
additionally, “the major potential for cost reductions through learning lies in the build-up 
of local technological capabilities” (emphasis in original).148 
Technology transfer is primarily understood to occur between developing and 
developed countries, where the conventional development paradigm utilized by those 
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studying transitions in developing countries asserts that “innovations originate from the 
North and need to be absorbed by the South.”149 
In order to catalyze technology transfer processes, international actors have 
developed various mechanisms and tools to expedite and incentivize technology transfer. 
One of the most well-known methods for facilitating low-carbon technology transfer is 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), established under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Through the CDM, “a country with an emission-reduction or emission limitation 
commitment under the Kyoto Protocol,” referred to as an Annex B Party, can implement 
emission-reduction projects in developing countries and earn certified emission reduction 
(CER) credits. Each CER is equivalent to one ton of CO2, and can be traded and sold by 
industrialized countries to count towards their own emission reduction targets set by the 
Kyoto Protocol.150 
Similar to the CDM, the joint implementation mechanism allows Annex B countries 
to implement emission-reduction projects in other Annex B countries. Countries then 
earn emission reduction units, also equivalent to one ton of CO2, which can be counted 
towards their own Kyoto emission reduction target.151 
International organizations have been paramount in the movement to facilitate low-
carbon technology transfer in developing countries. Technology transfer encompasses 
many different processes, such as capacity building, technical training and technological 
learning, and transfer of intellectual property. Most technology transfer takes place in the 
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private sector.152 In order to promote the development of climate technologies, the UN in 
particular has overseen the establishment of multiple mechanisms and frameworks. These 
include the Technology Mechanism (2010), the Technology Executive Committee 
(policy arm of the Technology Mechanism), the Climate Technology Centre and Network 
(implementation arm of the TM), Technology Framework (established in the Paris 
Agreement to “provide overarching guidance to the work of the Technology 
Mechanism”), and technology needs assessments (established in 2001).153  
Another critical aspect of technology transfer is intellectual property. In 1995, the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement as part of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement was entered into force. The TRIPS Agreement 
details issues related to intellectual property rights (IPRs), “establishes standards of 
protection as well as rules on administration and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights,” and “provides for the application of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to 
resolve disputes” related to topics discussed in TRIPS.154   
II.3.1.2 Markets and Finances 
Given that many developing countries experience rapid population growth, energy 
demand is rarely stagnant. Fluctuations in energy demand and subsequent government 
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action to shift the makeup of energy systems can lead to increased incentives to explore 
alternative energy sources.155  
The political and economic structure required for the facilitation of low-carbon 
technologies varies; “[e]vidence is mixed on whether coordinated market economies are 
better at accelerating low-carbon transitions.”156 Those successful at promulgating low-
carbon technologies do not strictly adhere to principles of capitalism that emphasize 
“interrelationships between labour markets, welfare, electoral systems and types of 
innovation.”157 
Financing for the implementation of renewable energy systems in developing 
countries has primarily come from developed countries and international organizations. 
Bilateral financial assistance from developed to developing countries often manifests in 
the forms of official development assistance (ODA), direct loans, or foreign-direct 
investment (FDI). The OECD Development Assistance Committee defines ODA as 
“government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries.”158 ODA must be both “provided by official agencies” 
and “concessional . . . and administered with the promotion of the economic development 
and welfare of developing countries as the main objective.”159 Governments can also 
receive loans from either governments or multilateral funding institutions.160 FDI 
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“involves direct investment in physical plant and equipment in one country by business 
interests from a foreign country.”161  
International organizations are also highly involved in funding projects and processes 
as a part of energy transitions. Multiple MDBs have historically driven the provision of 
mitigation financing. In 2014, the African Development Bank reported that mitigation 
financing was divided between seven different MDBs totaling $23.3 billion, with the 
majority (26%) coming from the World Bank.162 Assistance from MDBs can come in 
multiple forms, such as loans, grants, technical assistance, or a combination of multiple 
or all of the three.163 Aside from MDBs, multiple international organizations operate 
under mandates to provide financing for environmental or sustainable projects; the 
concept of sustainable financing has rapidly grown as more countries seek to implement 
environmentally sustainable projects. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was 
founded in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit to provide funds for “developing countries and 
countries with economies in transition to meet the objectives of the international 
environmental conventions and agreements.”164 In a similar vein, the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF) was established at the Conference of Parties (COP) 16 in 2010 by UNFCCC 
parties to serve as part of the Convention’s financial arm. The GCF aims to direct climate 
finance for the purposes of adaptation and mitigation actions taken in developing 
countries. Importantly, the GCF places specific emphasis on the ownership of developing 
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countries in projects, and requires countries to designate an individual to liaise between 
the GCF and the country’s government.165 
In addition to the aforementioned mechanisms to reduce emissions, the Kyoto 
Protocol also initiated the Adaptation Fund, established in 2001 for the establishment of 
adaptation projects “in developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.”166 
II.3.1.3 Political 
Considering that many countries lack established policy to address renewable energy, 
many of the policies to govern renewable energy sectors are developed at the niche level. 
Regarding options for the implementation of RE policies, two of the most common are 
feed-in tariffs (FITs) and renewable portfolio standards (RPSs). Both are aimed at 
creating a renewable energy market—thus, their implementation is indicative of a 
country’s goal to include RE in its long-term energy regime. By creating long-term 
markets for RE, both policies are able to reduce the risk to investors. RPSs and FITs have 
been adopted at both the national and subnational level. Multiple actors, including 
international donors, businesses, and NGOs have been active in pushing developing 
countries to implement both policies. Even with this wide support, each option’s relative 
effectiveness is contested. Studies done across OECD and non-OECD countries reach a 
variety of conclusions on the results of FIT implementation.167 Feed-in tariffs “provide 
RE producers with a preferential price per unit of generation (e.g., kWh) over a set period 
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of time (e.g., 10 to 15 years), designed to enable investors to recover their investments 
over time.”168 RPSs, also referred to as “quota systems,” “are mandates rather than 
financial incentives,” and “require utilities to procure a specified percentage of electricity 
generation or sales from renewable sources.”169 
II.3.1.4 Socio-Cultural 
The globalization of actors involved in producing clean technologies necessitates the 
occurrence of both global and local learning processes in order for the successful 
diffusion of clean technologies. Regarding the implementation and dissemination of 
technologies on the ground, local learning occurs as it does in traditional investment 
projects, where local firms are responsible for driving the local market and, in many 
cases, producing at least a component of the goods and services. Global learning 
processes are incorporated as companies located abroad become increasingly responsible 
for the production of necessary components. Thus, the investment conditions present in 
developing countries pursuing clean technologies are contingent upon both “global and 
local learning processes, which, in turn, depend on domestic and international regulatory, 
institutional, and industrial contexts.”170  
II.3.2 Barriers to Niche Breakthrough 
II.3.2.1 Technological 
Whether a country is able to successfully absorb technology through technology 
transfer depends on its absorptive capacity, or its ability to assimilate and apply new 
information received from external sources. This ultimately depends largely on a 
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country’s prior related knowledge.171 Absorptive capacity is also highly indicative of a 
country or organization’s innovative capabilities.172 
The IPCC describes 10 different policy tools governments can employ to create 
enabling environments for technology transfer. These include national systems of 
innovation; social infrastructure and participatory approaches; human and institutional 
capacities; macroeconomic policy frameworks; sustainable markets; national legal 
institutions; codes, standards, and certification; equity considerations; rights to productive 
resources; and research and technology development.173 Rather than efficacy, the main 
challenge facing developing countries’ ability to employ these tools is limited 
institutional capacity. 
While multiple international initiatives have been launched to facilitate technology 
transfer in developing countries similar to the CDM, their effectiveness is debatable. The 
cost of funding activities such as R&D or bolstering institutional capacity and innovation 
capabilities has precluded such initiatives from making a sustained impact on countries 
where they are implemented.174 
A unique challenge to technology transfer in developing countries through 
collaborative research and development (R&D) stems from the fact that traditionally, 
private firms have been the subject of collaborative R&D specifically in industries of 
commercial interest to said firms—thus, collaboration between private firms and 
developing countries “for the purposes of delivering a public good . . . or specific 
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considerations relating to climate technology R&D” has not occurred on the same 
level.175 “[C]ollaborative climate technology R&D needs to involve a range of private, 
public and not-for-profit actors, but can require involvement of developing country actors 
that have limited innovation capacities and are therefore of little strategic interest to 
international technology leading firms.”176 
There is additionally an ongoing ideological debate regarding whether or not IPRs act 
as a barrier to technology transfer. In 2013, Ecuador introduced the idea that climate 
change technology may run into barriers with the TRIPS agreement.177 Views span from 
IPRs most certainly acting as a barrier to technology transfer, to IPRs being a problem yet 
not a relevant one, to IPRs not being a barrier at all.178 In the past, international climate 
negotiations stalemated because of countries’ differing perspectives on IPRs and their 
role in technology transfer.179 This debate has also taken the form of the North-South 
debate, with more developed countries arguing for a lack of IPRs as a barrier to 
technology transfer and developed countries taking the opposite position. The two sides 
of this debate contest the importance of IPRs in technology transfer, with one arguing 
that IPRs, primarily in the form of patents, prohibit access to new technologies. In 
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contrast, other countries argue that the main barrier to technology transfer in developing 
countries is a lack of IPR law—IPRs are seen as a catalyst.180 
Limited institutional and productive capacity also hinders countries’ ability to 
produce niche technologies. Many developing countries lack either sufficient raw 
materials or the production lines to assemble materials, necessitating the import of 
resources and making countries vulnerable to consistency of supply and price 
fluctuations. These vulnerabilities impede manufacturing and eventual implementation of 
niche developments.181 
II.3.2.2 Markets and Finances 
Due to the limited financial resources of many developing countries, energy 
transitions are often financed by outside actors, such as multilateral development banks 
or international NGOs. Donor interventions are often heavily present. These interventions 
are “planned development programs and projects that are funded either by multilateral 
organizations, such as the World Bank and agencies of the United Nations, or by bilateral 
donor agencies that distribute aid between countries.”182 Donor interventions can affect 
both the regime and niche levels. At the regime level, interventions may include policy 
advising, institutional support and technical training, capacity-building for government 
agencies and other regime actors.183 
In the event that donor countries provide RE subsidies for developing countries, these 
subsidies “can actually undermine nascent markets for RE by creating an expectation 
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among customers that such products should be free or subsidized.184Moreover, “direct 
donor investment as a type of subsidization does little to catalyze private investment” in 
the RE sector.185 Instead of donor support going towards subsidization, better outcomes 
would likely result if support is channeled towards policy and market reforms.186  
Developing countries may also face challenges attracting investment if project 
developers perceive the uncertainties or risks of an investment to outweigh the potential 
profits, as seen in Malaysia.187 
II.3.2.3 Political 
While helpful in many respects, the presence of transnational actors, specifically in 
the form of donor interventions, may present additional challenges to the uptake of niche 
innovations in developing countries. The necessitation of holistic support, in addition to 
mere project development, is a key measure of whether or not a niche experiment will 
succeed. Rather than the technology itself, political and institutional aspects are the main 
barriers to successful upscaling of niche technologies. Projects designed with support 
from strong vertical linkages (such as complementary policies at the regime level) lead to 
successful upscaling, whereas projects initiated by international development agencies, 
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hich often lack these same linkages, “are seldom diffused” and rarely lead to overarching 
shifts in practices.188 
Although foreign direct investment (FDI) is often utilized in projects to increase RE 
diffusion in developing countries, the efficacy of FDI in contributing to a robust domestic 
RE industry is questionable. Using two different two-stage estimation methods, Pfeiffer 
and Mulder modeled 108 developing countries’ choices (between 1980 and 2019) 
regarding both whether or not to adopt renewable energy technologies and “the amount 
of electricity to produce from renewable energy sources.”189 As Pfeiffer and Mulder 
explain, domestic institutions are much more indicative of the probability that renewable 
energy, specifically non-hydro RE (NHRE), is successfully adopted. Ultimately, they find 
that “donor-driven investment and attention given to NHRE adoption are insufficient in 
themselves to compensate for the fragile institutional environment in these countries.”190 
Thus, rather than bolster the uptake of NHRE, the presence of ODA “reduces the 
probability of NHRE adoption”; increasing FDI has been shown to lower the probability 
of NHRE adoption.191 
II.3.2.4 Socio-Cultural 
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In many developing countries, underlying societal problems often eclipse 
conversations about renewable energy and existential moral issues such as Western 
notions of environmentalism and sustainability.192  
The hindrance of niche development by donor presence is further documented. Rather 
than providing the stability, predictability, and clarity that many donors advertise, it has 
been shown that donor interventions “create new arenas for struggle over resources, 
interests, meaning, interpretations and rationalities between various actors.”193 
Ultimately, renewable energy technology development and reliance on RE are driven 
by different factors; “simply increasing RE generation does not necessarily decrease 
reliance on fossil fuels nor help countries make the transition to a clean energy 
economy.”194  
 
II.4 Suitability of the MLP for developing countries 
Upon analyzing relevant factors of developing countries’ energy transitions, it is 
apparent that many of the same factors present in developed countries’ transitions are 
present. However, given that the MLP was developed for and initially applied to 
transitions in developed countries, it has become increasingly apparent that the MLP does 
not, in many ways, account for factors that are at the forefront of energy transitions in the 
global South. This incompatibility is evident both in analyzing individual transitions and 
in efforts to apply models utilizing the MLP to these transitions; none of the four 
pathways described by Schot and Geels in their typology of transition pathways accounts 
for the presence of transnational or intermediary actors.  
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Anna Wieczorek’s systematic review of 115 publications about sustainability 
transitions in developing countries provides a useful starting point for discussing the 
shortcomings of traditional socio-technical frameworks (Table 4).195 
Table 4 
Summary of insights regarding developing countries’ sustainability transitions (Adapted from Wieczorek, 2018:212). 
Major theme Insights 
Experiments and 
upscaling 
There emerge transnational sustainability experiments that embody 
novel sources of capability-formation other than industrialised firms 
which challenges convergence theories. 
 Vertical and horizontal linkages are important for upscaling of 
experiments. 
 Definition of sustainability experiments is useful but needs further 
specification to create an effective design for developing countries. 
Transnational linkages Regime and niche actors are increasingly transnationally connected 
and there are technology, capital and knowledge flows. However, 
local assets and policies still play an important role. 
 Regimes in developing countries are less uniform than in the Western 
world. Old technologies exist alongside new ones, providing the 
same service. 
Stability and change Stability does not necessarily obstruct regime transformation in 
developing countries. Many systems are absent or highly 
dysfunctional. 
Path-dependence Some aspects of path-dependence in developing countries (colonial 
past) form barriers to sustainability transitions, while underdeveloped 
or absent fossil fuel-based infrastructures provide opportunities. 
 Institutional contexts are place specific. 
Contextual factors Landscape forces are not as exogenous as theory predicts and can 
have a direct impact or be deliberately mobilised by niche actors. 
Normative orientation Sustainability perception differs across societies, causing 
disagreements about problems and their solutions. 
 
Within the themes that Wieczorek identifies, transnational linkages, contextual factors, 
and normative orientation are especially useful in cataloging how the MLP can be 
augmented by other disciplines to better apply to transitions in developing countries. 
Intermediaries, which she does not explicitly mention but are often mentioned in 
conjunction with transnational linkages, are also relevant. 
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Transnational linkages are “the cross-border relationships, infrastructures and 
interactions that enable flows and circulations of resources including people (actors), 
knowledge, technologies, institutions and finance.”196 Fields outside of socio-technical 
theory are particularly relevant for providing insight on transnational linkages, such as 
geography and political economy. Transnational linkages allow for “actors to 
complement lacking resources,” thus further enabling innovation.197 These linkages are 
especially common in the form of donor interventions, which as discussed, occur 
frequently at both the regime and niche levels with Donor interventions at the niche level 
may include direct financial support for the development of niche-level experiments.198 
Moreover, the role of intermediaries in sustainability transitions has received 
increasing attention. While intermediaries have been defined in a myriad of ways, 
specifically in relation to transitions, “transition intermediaries” are 
actors and platforms that positively influence sustainability transition processes 
by linking actors and activities, and their related skills and resources, or by 
connecting transition visions and demands of networks of actors with existing 
regimes in order to create momentum for socio-technical system change, to create 
new collaborations within and across niche technologies, ideas and markets, and 
to disrupt dominant unsustainable socio-technical configurations.199 
 
This definition reflects numerous definitions for intermediaries present in a number of 
processes, where intermediaries are present at the niche, regime, and systemic levels, and 
can assume their role as intermediaries intentionally or unintentionally.200 Increased 
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attention to intermediaries reflects the increased focus on transnational linkages, in which 
intermediaries are critical to facilitate cross-border dynamics. 
Discussions on intermediaries and transnational actors reflect a lack of clarity on who 
might be considered an actor at each level of the MLP. Specifically for the landscape 
level, seeing as it is considered merely “background” wherein no activities happen within 
it, any landscape change is either independent of any actors or results from actors 
operating at the niche and regime levels.”201 However, as Wieczorek notes, the landscape 
level has been found to be affected by action at the niche and regime levels, calling into 
question the assumption that the landscape level is unable to be affected directly.202  
There has been little consideration given to the normative aspects of transitions, 
resulting in many highlighting that there is a lack of consensus regarding what 
“sustainability” even is. Specifically in relation to the global South, environmental issues 
in the form of existential, as opposed to concrete and definable, problems will be 
dominated by issues such as a lack of access to electricity, widespread poverty, or general 
social inequalities.203 Moreover, technologies or practices that Western nations see as 
“sustainable,” such as renewable energy systems, are often perceived through different 
normative lenses in developing countries. A statement by an interviewee in Tanzania 
regarding incentives for solar energy stated: “It doesn’t have anything to do with climate 
change; it is driven by rural electrification and people wanting electricity.”204  
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Chapter III: Landscape Level 
The landscape level describes the exogenous structure within which regime and niche 
actors operate, and while “beyond the direct influence of regime and niche actors,” the 
level is affected by both external events and broad, societal shifts that arise as a result of 
actions by niche and regime actors.205 Relevant landscape factors for Mongolia’s energy 
transition include the international community’s recognition of anthropogenic climate 
change, attitude towards sustainable development, the nature of relationships between 
developed and developing countries and the acceptance, promulgation of renewable 
energy technologies, and normative framing. Relevant domestic landscape conditions 
include Mongolia’s historic ties with the international community. 
 
III.1 International Factors 
III.1.1 Attribution of Global Warming to Anthropogenic Causes  
Reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are published 
periodically to inform the general public about the latest findings regarding climate 
change as agreed to by the global scientific community. With every publication, the IPCC 
has ratcheted up its attribution of the increase in global temperatures, and subsequent 
changes in the global climate, to human activity. The IPCC’s 1990 First Assessment 
Report did not confirm human responsibility for observed worldwide warming, stating 
instead that:  
The size of this warming is broadly consistent with predictions of climate models, but 
it is also of the same magnitude as natural climate variability. Thus the observed 
increase could be largely due to this natural variability, alternatively this variability 
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and other human factors could have offset a still larger human-induced greenhouse 
warming.206 
 
The IPCC’s 1995 Second Assessment Report states that “The balance of evidence 
suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate.”207 The attribution 
of increase in global temperature to anthropogenic causes is more forceful with every 
report: in 2001, warming is “likely” due to increases in GHG concentrations, in 2007, 
“very likely,” and in 2014, the IPCC writes that “[i]t is extremely likely that more than 
half of the observed increase in global average temperature from 1951 to 2010 was 
caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other 
anthropogenic forcings together.”208  
Coupled with the heightened assignment of climate change to human activity is a plea 
for society to undertake a fundamental shift away from unsustainable fuel sources. The 
IPCC goes on to write in 2014 that “[t]he stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
at low levels requires a fundamental transformation of the energy supply system, 
including the long-term phase-out of unabated fossil fuel conversion technologies and 
their substitution by low-GHG alternatives.”209 This conclusion is reiterated in a 2018 
IPCC report, which affirms “Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5˚C with no or 
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limited overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban 
and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems (high 
confidence).”210  
III.1.2 Conceptions of Development 
Following the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987, the international 
community began to confront what a future in which sustainable development was 
prioritized might look like. This reckoning began in the 1990s, particularly when the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, FCCC) was 
adopted in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit. The Convention still reflected the attitude at 
the time that development (e.g., economic and social development and poverty 
eradication) should be developing countries’ main priority, and that the achievements of 
development and environmental policies were, to a certain extent, mutually exclusive. 
Ultimately, developing countries should fully develop first, and then focus on sustainable 
development. Article 4.7 of the FCCC states: 
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their 
commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by 
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to 
financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that 
economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties.211 
 
These commitments, which are to be undertaken by all Parties to the Convention, include 
tasks such as periodically reporting national emissions, implementing climate change 
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mitigation programs, promoting sustainable management, developing mechanisms for 
adapting to climate change, considering climate change in all policy formulation, and 
participating in ongoing efforts to further understand climate change—practices widely in 
line with the principles grounding sustainable development.212 
As the international community sought to determine what processes would need to be 
undertaken to achieve development, countries defined development through broad ideals 
such as the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) formed in 2000. Whereas 
“ensure environmental sustainability” was a single MDG, it is now recognized that when 
properly implemented, sustainable development practices, and renewable energy systems 
in particular, are potential solutions to many other aspects of development, such as the 
eradication of extreme poverty and social inequality. Seven of the UN’s 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, explicitly mention “sustainability” or 
“climate.”213 Utilizing renewable energy sources or cleaner fuels immediately improves 
indoor air quality and resulting health outcomes. The provision of energy access through 
renewable sources can allow communities to be more productive, increasing economic 
activity and spurring traditional development goals such as poverty eradication.214 
Renewable energy is also increasingly looked to as an ideal solution to addressing the 
widespread lack of energy access customary in many developing countries. Whereas 
fossil-fuel-based electricity systems are “poorly suited to rural areas” given challenges 
that arise with grid connectivity and infrastructure, distributed renewable energy systems 
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have been proven to be very effective in providing electricity to these formerly 
unconnected areas.215 
Landscape pressure to shift away from unsustainable energy sources is driven by 
more than a desire to mitigate warming temperatures; in addition to contributing 
significantly to GHG concentrations, emissions from fossil-fuel-based energy sources are 
detrimental for human health, specifically by contributing to air pollution. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) writes in the 2016 World Energy Outlook that 
“Energy production and use, mostly from unregulated, poorly regulated or inefficient fuel 
combustion, are the single most important man-made sources of air pollutant 
emissions.”216 Many premature deaths are attributable to outdoor air pollution, and this 
number continues to rise despite efforts to expand renewable energy use. Due to 
demographic trends and circumstances such as the increase of urbanization and rising 
energy use, in particular for developing countries in Asia (including Mongolia), the IEA 
predicts that these deaths will increase from 3 million in 2016 to 4.5 million in 2040.217 
III.1.3 Commitments of Developed Countries to Developing Countries 
The extent to which developed countries are obligated to assist in the development of 
countries in the global South has been a contentious issue for decades. The international 
community has been mired in an ideological debate over who should absorb the majority 
of costs for mitigating climate change. The two areas in which developed countries have 
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increasingly agreed to assist developing countries are technology transfer and sustainable 
financing. 
III.1.3.1 Technology Transfer 
The UNFCCC was the first international agreement to establish that developed 
countries were obligated to help developing countries; in particular, a commitment to 
initiating technology transfer was highlighted. The Convention clarifies that developed 
countries  
shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, 
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how 
to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to 
implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed 
country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of endogenous 
capacities and technologies of developing country Parties.218 
  
The theme of technology transfer is prominent in additional agreements adopted by the 
UN. Agenda 21 was also adopted by countries at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit as a 
comprehensive action plan to address society’s impact on the environment. Chapter 34, 
paragraph 34.4 of Agenda 21 specifically describes the need for “favourable access to 
and transfer of environmentally sound technologies, in particular to developing 
countries.”219 Agenda 21 highlights the need for long-term relationships to be cultivated 
in order to oversee the necessary “iterative processes” involved in technology transfer. 
Chapter 34, paragraph 34.10 of Agenda 21 states: “Consideration must be given to the 
role of patent protection and intellectual property rights along with an examination of 
their impact on the access to and transfer of environmentally sound technology.”220 
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The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1998 as an agreement linked to the UNFCCC, both 
reiterates and expands on developed countries’ obligations as stated in the FCCC. In 
addition to aiding in the transfer of environmentally sound technologies, developed 
countries are expected to contribute to the strengthening of human and institutional 
capacities in developing countries.221 Technology transfer is re-emphasized in the Paris 
Agreement, the second agreement linked to the UNFCCC adopted in 2015; the 
Agreement implores Parties to “strengthen cooperative action on technology 
development and transfer.”222 
III.1.3.2 Sustainable Financing 
In addition to fostering technology transfer, the provision of financing is an additional 
responsibility developed countries have shouldered in order to help facilitate developing 
countries. This financial support for renewable systems has enabled developing countries 
to adopt renewable energy technologies. Investment in renewable energy technologies 
continues to increase, and developing and emerging economies first surpassed developed 
countries in renewable energy investment in 2015.223  
Using analogous language to that which is used to describe technology transfer, the 
UNFCCC and its linked agreements all elucidate the responsibility of developed 
countries to provide financial resources for developing countries.224 
In addition to the mention of financial responsibilities in international agreements, 
various international institutions, such as the aforementioned Global Environment 
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Facility (GEF) in 1992 and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in 2010, have been 
established with the distinct purpose of providing financial assistance to developing 
countries pursuing environmental goals.225 
Specific shocks unrelated specifically to sustainability and energy further motivated 
countries to provide sustainable financing opportunities. The global financial crisis 
spurred the United Nations Environment Programme to propose a $3.1 economic 
stimulus package called the “Global Green New Deal,” which outlined three objectives: 
reviving the global economy, reducing carbon dependency, and furthering the 
Millennium Development Goal of ending extreme world poverty.226 This led countries 
such as China, the United States, South Korea, and France to allocate billions of dollars 
towards the development of green technologies.227 Overall, the global market for clean 
technologies grew 31% between 2008 and 2011.228 
III.1.4 Composition of Global Energy Sources 
As the landscape level has slowly evolved to further incorporate principles and 
practices of sustainable development, energy as an overarching concept has subsequently 
transformed, further aligning with sustainable development practices. Fossil fuel energy 
sources continue to dominate the makeup of global energy systems, although the shares 
of each fossil-fuel source have shifted since the mid-twentieth century (Figure 8). While 
the percentage of energy use from oil, coal, and natural gas was the same in 2014 (81%) 
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as it was in 1986, within this 81%, oil has declined, whereas natural gas and coal have 
both increased (19% to 21% and 25% to 28%, respectively).229 
 
Fig. 8. Shares of primary energy sources (percentage) (BP, 2017). 
The impacts of specific shocks at the landscape level are visible in Figure 8, 
specifically, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. While each crisis arose out of different 
geopolitical and economic circumstances, both led to relatively immediate spikes in the 
price of oil, leading to the notable declines in oil’s share of the world’s energy supply.230 
While countries responded differently to these shocks, many European nations moved to 
reduce oil dependency.231 
In addition to the oil industry, the nuclear energy sector has experienced similar 
specific shocks. These shocks often result in regional, as opposed to global, effects given 
                                               
229 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2016 Special Report: Energy and Air 
Pollution, 39. 
230 Fiona Venn, The Oil Crisis (London: Routledge, 2016), ix. 
231 Verbong and Geels, “The Ongoing Energy Transition,” 1028. 
 
 
68 
individual countries’ distinct relationships with varying energy sources. For example, in 
Germany’s electricity transition, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident (in which an 
explosion in one of the power plants reactors led to the release of radioactive debris) 
mobilized anti-nuclear activists, who began to promote the use of alternative energy 
sources.232  
An additional landscape shock occurred in 2011 with the nuclear accident at the 
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in Japan. The accident prompted action from Japan that 
reverberated out to include many Asian countries, including Mongolia. Following the 
Fukushima accident, CEO and Chairman of Japan’s SoftBank Corporation founded the 
Renewable Energy Institute (formerly Japan Renewable Energy Foundation) with the 
intent of accelerating renewable energy development in Japan and internationally. The 
concept of the Asia Super Grid (ASG) was introduced at the event establishing the 
Institute, which also included a presentation about Mongolia’s eventual contribution to 
the Grid from the chairman of Newcom LLC, a Mongolian company.233 The ASG would 
connect electricity grids across multiple Asian nations; currently, the concept is supported 
by China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and Mongolia.234 
 
 
                                               
232 Geels et al., “The Socio-Technical Dynamics of Low-Carbon Transitions,” 467; “Chapter I The Site and 
Accident Sequence - Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impact,” Nuclear Energy Agency, 
last modified 2002, accessed April 11, 2019, https://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/chernobyl/c01.html. 
233 “Celebration to Commemorate the Establishment of Japan Renewable Energy Foundation | Event,” 
Renewable Energy Institute, last modified September 12, 2011, accessed October 31, 2018, 
https://www.renewable-ei.org/en/activities/events/20110912.html. 
“About ASG | Asia Super Grid,” Renewable Energy Institute, accessed October 31, 2018, 
https://www.renewable-ei.org/en/asg/about/. 
234 Charles Zhang, “An Asia Super Grid Would Be a Boon for Clean Energy—If It Gets Built,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, last modified September 5, 2018, accessed October 31, 2018, 
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III.1.5 Normative Framing 
Gradual landscape changes have also been furthered by normative framing, such as 
the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set in 2015, as well as organizations 
that increasingly highlight achieving universal access to sustainable energy. SDG7 in 
particular is to “ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for 
all.”235 In 2011, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched the organization 
Sustainable Energy for All (SEforAll) to mobilize action around the three components of 
SDG7: “ensuring universal access to modern energy services,” “doubling the share of 
renewable energy in the global energy mix,” and “doubling the global rate of 
improvement in energy efficiency.”236 Following the creation of SEforAll, the UN 
General Assembly declared 2012 as the “International Year of Sustainable Energy for 
All,” and the period 2014-2024 as the Decade of Sustainable Energy for All.237 The UN 
has initiated efforts to promote renewable energy for decades, supporting the 
development of an international agency dedicated to renewable energy since 1981.238 
There is not one specific body within the UN to promote renewable energy; rather, efforts 
are spread across multiple UN agencies, such as the UN Environment Programme 
(UNEP), the General Assembly, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Outside 
of the UN, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) was founded in 2009 
                                               
235 “Goal 7,” Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, accessed October 6, 2018, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg7. 
236 “About Us,” Sustainable Energy for All (SEforALL), accessed October 17, 2018, 
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Nations, last modified December 21, 2012, accessed April 23, 2019, 
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with the mission of promoting “the widespread adoption and sustainable use of all forms 
of renewable energy.”239  
 
III.2 Domestic Factors 
In addition to favorable conditions shaped by the evolution of landscape factors at the 
international level, Mongolia’s energy transition has also been helped by unique domestic 
landscape conditions, such as Mongolia’s historic proclivity towards international 
participation.  
III.2.1 Embrace of International Community 
Mongolia’s good standing with the international community has catalyzed the ease 
with which Mongolia pursues development projects. While Mongolia has independently 
made progress on determining its development agenda and goals, much of the pressure 
for it to adopt policies towards a larger goal of sustainable development stems from 
international partners.  
Mongolia’s geopolitical strategy is highly dependent on its physical placement 
between two authoritarian global powers, Russia and China. Mongolia’s National 
Security Concept clarifies its “third neighbor” strategy, which specifies that “bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation with highly developed democracies in political, economic, 
cultural, and humanitarian affairs shall be undertaken.”240 Coined in 1990 by former 
United States Secretary of State James A. Baker, the term “third neighbor” was used to 
                                               
239 “About IRENA,” International Renewable Energy Agency, accessed November 2, 2018, 
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describe the U.S.’s relationship to Mongolia (with its other two neighbors being China 
and the former Soviet Union).241 
Mongolia’s proclivity towards international participation is evident in its diplomatic 
forays. Mongolia prides itself on being a diplomatic partner to many, even countries that 
others turn away from—it maintains diplomatic relations with both South and North 
Korea.242 The country sent troops to Iraq to support the United States from 2003 to 2008, 
and still has troops in Afghanistan.243 Additionally, Mongolia’s presence among 
democratic international organizations is notable considering Mongolia’s geopolitical 
status. Mongolia served as the chair of the Community of Democracies from 2011 to 
2013.244 Mongolia is also one of only nine NATO “partner” nations, with other Asian 
partner nations being Japan and the Republic of Korea.245 
One of the most active international organizations in Mongolia is the UN; this activity 
is facilitated through multiple agencies and organizations, such as the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), but also through the 
facilitation of Mongolia’s participation in various UN treaties and agreements—
Mongolia is party to 14 different UN conventions and treaties related to the 
environment.246 While many of these conventions and treaties do not require parties to 
                                               
241 Munkh-Ochir Dorjjugder, “Mongolia’s ‘Third Neighbor’ Doctrine and North Korea,” Brookings 
Institution, January 28, 2011, accessed March 18, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/mongolias-
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245 “NATO - Topic: Relations with Partners across the Globe,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last 
modified May 19, 2017, accessed November 20, 2018, 
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take action, certain agreements require parties to complete various reports and progress 
updates. Mongolia ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC 
in 1993 and has since signed on to both agreements linked to the Convention as well, the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement (ratified in 1999 and 2016, respectively).247 The 
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement all specify different reporting 
requirements that any party to the treaties must meet. 
Even before Mongolia expressed an explicit interest in sustainable development as an 
overarching focus for its domestic policy agenda, external actors enabled the country to 
consider such a path: the seminal document that outlines Mongolia’s wind energy 
potential was sponsored by two organizations in the United States—the Department of 
Energy and the U.S. Agency for International Development.248 The agencies’ exact 
motivation to undertake an assessment of Mongolia’s wind energy resources is unclear; 
the only information available is that the agencies were, at the time, “sponsoring a 
program to help accelerate the use of wind energy technology in Mongolia.”249 Since the 
publication of Mongolia’s Wind Energy Resource Atlas in 1998, international interest in 
Mongolia’s renewable energy potential only continues to grow. 
 
  
                                               
247 “Mongolia,” UNFCCC, accessed March 4, 2019, https://unfccc.int/node/61117. 
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Chapter IV: Regime Level  
IV.1 Incumbent Regime 
The existing energy regime in Mongolia is characterized by a heavy reliance on coal 
and decentralized energy systems. The energy system in Mongolia is composed of five 
independent systems: the Central Energy System (CES), the Western Energy System 
(WES), the Altai-Uliastai Energy System (AUES), the Eastern Energy System (EES), and 
the South Gobi Region. Three are centralized power grids (CES, WES, EES), the latter 
two are isolated systems.250 In total, these energy systems support nine combined heat 
and power (CHP) plants, 600 small diesel generators, 13 hydroelectric plants, and 
multiple solar and wind systems both off- and on-grid.251 CHP plants are responsible for 
the vast majority of Mongolia’s electricity capacity; in 2017 they accounted for about 
88% of installed capacity.252 However, Mongolia’s renewable energy capacity has 
increased substantially since the first large-scale wind farm went into commission in 
2013. Renewable energy accounted for 10.16% of installed capacity in 2017, and is set to 
increase to 21.79% by 2019.253 Due to the fact that domestic capacity is unable to 
sufficiently meet energy demand, Mongolia imports about 20% of its electricity, coming 
mainly from Russia (and to a lesser extent, China).254  
Many technologies currently operate within Mongolia’s energy industry (Table 5). 
                                               
250 Mongolia’s Initial Biennial Update Report, 20. 
251 Ibid., 44. 
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Table 5 
Existing technologies in Mongolia’s energy industry (Adapted from Technology Needs Assessment, Volume 2) 
(Ministry of Environment and Green Development, 2013a). 
Service Category Technology Description 
Electricity 
supply 
Fossil fuel Combined heat and 
power, large-scale 
Produces the majority of Mongolia’s 
electricity and heat energy, there are 7 
throughout the country 
Diesel for electricity 
generation 
Supplies electricity to province centers not 
connected to central grid 
Renewable 
energy 
Small-scale 
hydropower plant 
Operates in capacities from 150kW to 
12.0MW, 13 in total 
Small-scale solar PV Generate electricity for herders using 
independent solar PV systems 
Solar and wind 
hybrid technologies 
Built in some soum centers (wind power 
stations as well as combined solar-wind 
stations) 
  Large-scale wind*  Supplies electricity to the central grid, began 
operating in 2013 
  Large-scale solar 
PV* 
Supplies electricity to the central grid, began 
operating in 2015 
Heat 
supply 
Fossil fuel Combined heat and 
power, large scale 
Produces the majority of Mongolia’s 
electricity and heat energy, there are 7 
throughout the country 
Heating stations for 
space heating and 
domestic hot water 
Used in province centers 
 
Energy use in Mongolia is governed by a compendium of laws addressing various 
components of the industry. Most important is the Law on Energy, passed in 2001 by 
Parliament to “regulate matters relating to energy generation, transmission, distribution, 
dispatching and supply activities, construction of energy facilities, and energy 
consumption.”255 
Energy consumption is dominated by the industry and construction sectors (Figure 9).  
                                               
255 “Law on Energy (Unofficial English Translation),” 2001, accessed October 3, 2018, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/laws/1468%20English.pdf. 
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Fig. 9. Electricity consumption by sector (Ministry of Energy, 2014). 
A CHP plant is a type of thermal power plant that uses waste heat as an input to 
generate more electricity and heat.256 There is currently a proposal to construct CHP5 in 
Mongolia, financially backed by multiple MDBs and international organizations, 
including the Asian Development Bank, Engie (France), Nippon Export and Investment 
Insurance (Japan), and POSCO (South Korea).257 Plants that are planned for construction 
include CHP5 in Ulaanbaatar, the Tavan Tolgoi thermal power plant, the Baganuur 
thermal power plant, and thermal power plants in western Mongolia, one for export 
(Shivee Ovoo), and one in eastern Mongolia (Dornod). Combined, these plants would 
add 1950MW for use in Mongolia, with 9240MW to be exported from Shivee Ovoo. 
Three additional projects not included in the six aforementioned plants are at varying 
steps in the approval process: the Chandgana Coal project (east of Ulaanbaatar) the 
                                               
256 “Types of Thermal Power Plant: Combined Heat and Power,” British Geological Survey (BGS), 
accessed November 20, 2018, 
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/discoveringGeology/climateChange/CCS/CombinedHeatAndPowerPlant.html. 
257 “Combined Heat and Power Plant Number 5 Project (CHP5),” Asian Development Bank, last modified 
November 20, 2018, accessed November 19, 2018, https://www.adb.org/projects/46915-014/main. 
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Tevshiin Gobi power station, and a 100MW expansion for power plant 4 in Ulaanbaatar. 
These would add another 1300 MW.258 
Mongolia plans to build several thermal electric power stations near coal mines 
throughout the country in the next several years. There is currently a proposal to build a 
pulverized coal thermal supercritical power plant at the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine, with a 
capacity of 600MW.259 
Mongolia also has a limited number of hydropower plants. Despite proposals to 
construct more than 70 large and mid-sized dams, only two have been built—Durgun (12 
MW) and Taishir (11 MW). Additionally, there are 10 small plants that produce 
hydroelectricity. These plants have limited installed capacity and are unable to operate in 
winter due to freezing temperatures and resulting ice.260  
The cement and lime industries are key manufacturing industries for Mongolia, and 
contribute significantly to Mongolia’s GHG emissions.261 Emissions in all sectors in 
Mongolia have dramatically increased from 1990 to 2014: emissions from the energy 
sector increased 55.69%, agriculture 58.02%, and waste 187.49%.262  
 
IV.2 Drivers of Regime Tension 
While coal has been the dominant energy source in Mongolia for decades, the 
incumbent system has been put under increasing pressure in recent years due to numerous 
tensions within the regime. These include economic uncertainty, technological 
                                               
258 Ana-Maria Seman, Mongolia’s Energy Sector: Time for a Rethink (CEE Bankwatch Network, 2017), 
14. 
259 Third National Communication of Mongolia Under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
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261 Ibid., 12. 
262 Ibid., 14. 
 
 
77 
shortcomings, dissatisfaction with externalities from coal production (such as rising air 
pollution), and shifts in political agendas. 
IV.2.1 Technological 
The incumbent regime faces additional pressure from the technological limitations of 
existing infrastructure. Due to the fact that many of Mongolia’s coal-fired TPPs were 
constructed between 1960 and 1980, they are likely to be retired in the near future; the 
average efficiency rate of these plants is below 30%.263 A lack of management in the 
energy sector and poor incentives to increase the efficiency of heating systems results in 
significant energy loss during heat distribution, making heat supply costly and highly 
unreliable. Thus, there is enormous potential to improve the efficiency of Mongolia’s 
heating systems.264 However, there is little motivation for the public to conserve heat; 
rather than being billed for heating based on consumption, citizens are billed based on the 
area of their homes and apartments.265  
As Mongolia’s energy demand has increased, its reliance on imported energy has 
consequently increased. In order to stabilize the power system, Mongolia has turned to 
energy imported from Russia: imports increased to 1195.5 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in 
2013, compared to a recorded 366 GWh in 2012.266 The Government of Mongolia 
projects that annual energy demand will increase 500-600 megawatts (MW), or 3.5%, by 
                                               
263 Chen, Gönül, and Tumenjargal, Mongolia: Renewables Readiness Assessment, 10; Technology Needs 
Assessment: Volume 2 - Climate Change Mitigation in Mongolia (Ministry of Environment and Green 
Development, 2013), 49. 
264 Technology Needs Assessment: Volume 2 - Climate Change Mitigation in Mongolia, 23. 
265 Anonymous (UNDP NAMA), interviewed by author, Ulaanbaatar, March 21, 2019. 
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2020.267 Mongolia also imports electricity from China to supply towns along its southern 
border, as well as the Oyu Tolgoi mine.268 
IV.2.2 Markets and Finances 
With the guidance of various international partners, Mongolia continues to emphasize 
the expansion and utilization of sustainable financing practices. Initiated by the Dutch 
Development Bank (FMO), the International Financial Corporation (IFC), the Trade and 
Development Bank of Mongolia, the Mongolian Banker’s Association, and the Banking 
and Finance Academy, the country’s first Sustainable Financing Forum took place in 
2013, and has been happening annually since.269 The Forum is a chance for domestic and 
international actors to gather for the purpose of furthering Mongolia’s sustainable 
financing goals, and is organized by both Mongolian and international actors.270 Also 
established with the Forum was the Mongolian Sustainable Finance Initiative, which 
began as a tool to prioritize sustainable finance. All Mongolian banks committed to 
implementing the Initiative in 2013.271 In order to further break down and address 
barriers that persist to Mongolia’s pursuit of sustainable finance, the National Sustainable 
                                               
267 Ibid., 8.  
268 Mongolia’s Initial Biennial Update Report, 44. 
269 Mongolian Sustainble Finance Working Group, “Mongolian Sustainable Finance Initiative” (Lagos, 
Nigeria, March 3, 2014), accessed April 27, 2019, http://firstforsustainability.org/media/Badrakh-
MongolianBankersAssoc-SBN2014.pdf. 
270 “ТоС Монголын Тогтвортой Санхүүжилтийн Холбоо,” Монголын Тогтвортой Санхүүгийн 
Холбоо - Mongolian Sustainable Finance Association, accessed March 26, 2019, 
http://www.toc.mn/post/25. 
271 “Mongolian Sustainable Finance Initiative Brochure” (International Financial Corporation, n.d.), 
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D=AJPERES. 
 
 
79 
Finance Roadmap of Mongolia was developed by the IFC, the Mongolian Sustainable 
Finance Association, and the UN Environment Programme.272  
Mongolia’s focus on sustainable finance has extended to the creation of a domestic 
fund to expand access to sustainable financing to previously under-addressed sectors of 
the economy.273 The country also received support from international organizations, 
including multiple UN organizations, the IFC, and the Global Green Growth Institute 
(GGGI) to launch the Mongolia Green Credit Fund (MGCF). The MGCF is a national 
financing vehicle that will allow the government to meet targets set in various sustainable 
development policies.274 
IV.2.3 Political 
In order to support the construction and implementation of renewable energy projects, 
the Government of Mongolia has proposed and enacted laws and agendas that better align 
with a vision of sustainable energy. In addition to the Law on Energy, Mongolia’s energy 
sector is governed by the Renewable Energy Law of Mongolia, adopted in 2007 and most 
recently amended in 2015. The Law defines relevant terms, clarifies apposite authorities, 
and outlines regulatory practices in regards to Mongolia’s renewable energy sector.275  
                                               
272 Iaian Henderson, Nomindari Enkhtur, and Tumurkhuu Davaakhuu, National Sustainable Finance 
Roadmap of Mongolia (UNEP Inquiry, International Finance Corporation, Mongolian Sustainable Finance 
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273 “Mongolian Green Credit Fund (MGCF),” GGGI - Global Green Growth Institute, accessed March 26, 
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Green Credit Fund | PAGE,” Partnership for Action on Green Economy, last modified September 14, 2017, 
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The Renewable Energy Law dictates responsibilities for various actors and levels of 
government with respect to renewable energy. Included are the state parliament, the 
cabinet, the Ministry of Energy, local governors of aimags, soums,276 and Ulaanbaatar, 
and the Energy Regulatory Commission.277 Each of these actors plays a prominent role in 
overseeing and enacting energy policy. Parliament approved the National Renewable 
Energy Program (NREP) in 2005, which put forth a plan for the renewable energy 
industry from 2005-2020.278 In order to address the future of Mongolia’s energy sector, 
Parliament approved the State Policy on Energy in 2015, which details plans to reform 
the sector from 2015-2030.279 These reforms are to be implemented in two stages: 2015-
2023 and 2023-2030. In the first phase, the government aims for construction of six coal 
power plants to be completed. Goals within this period also include doubling the installed 
capacity, meeting the 10% installed capacity target for hydropower with two hydropower 
plants, and increasing renewable energy to 20% of installed capacity.280 In the second 
phase, renewable energy will be increased to 30%, smart energy systems will foster 
connection between regions with high-voltage transmission lines, and high-voltage 
transmission lines will export any excess energy to Northeast-Asian countries.281 
                                               
276 Administrative unit of division for aimags (provinces); comparable to a county. 
277 Chen, Gönül, and Tumenjargal, Mongolia: Renewables Readiness Assessment, 28. 
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In 2015, the Law on Energy was amended with the goal of “strengthen[ing] public-
private partnerships and creat[ing] a market-oriented framework for the energy sector.”282 
With the passing of the Law on Energy was the creation of Mongolia’s Energy 
Regulatory Commission, responsible for overall regulation of the energy sector, including 
the generation, transmission, distribution, dispatch, and supply of energy.283 Amendments 
to the Law on Energy include goals of bringing electricity imports down to zero, yet this 
goal will come at the cost of constructing additional coal power plants and hydropower 
plants.284  
The Government of Mongolia has also adopted numerous environmental policies in 
recognition of and to contribute to the ongoing regime shift. As Mongolia continues to 
prioritize sustainable development, multiple environmentally-oriented policies have been 
adopted (Table 6). These environmental policies are both the result of Mongolia-led 
initiatives, as well as collaborative efforts to further define how Mongolia pursues 
sustainable development. 
Table 6 
Environmental and sustainability policies implemented in Mongolia (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 2017:25). 
Name 
Year Passed 
(Amended) In Effect  
Law on Environmental Protection 1995 (2007, 2012) N/A 
Water Law 1995 (2004, 2010, 2012) N/A 
Forest Law 1995 (2012, 2013) N/A 
Law on Air 1995 (2012) N/A 
National Action Programme on Climate Change 2000 (2011) 2011-2021 
Law on Energy 2001 (2015) N/A 
Law on Renewable Energy 2007 (2015) N/A 
National Agriculture Development Policy 2010 2010-2021 
Law on Waste 2012 N/A 
Green Development Policy 2014 2014-2030 
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State Policy on Industry 2015 2015-2030 
State Policy on Energy 2015 2015-2030 
State Policy on Forest 2015 2016-2030 
Sustainable Development Vision, 2030 2016 2016-2030 
 
Multiple third-party organizations have enabled the Government of Mongolia to 
introduce additional policy mechanisms to further codify sustainable development into 
law. Since Mongolia declared that green development would be the country’s economic 
development strategy in 2012, GGGI has assisted the development of green growth plans 
for Mongolia’s energy and transportation sectors. Out of this partnership resulted the 
Strategies for Development of Green Energy Systems in Mongolia, a project completed 
in 2014 that also included collaboration with the Stockholm Environment Institute – U.S. 
Center.285 Green energy systems are defined by GGGI as “those that minimize carbon, 
local air pollution, and other environmental impacts.”286 
Additional disruptive policies have been born out of Mongolia’s active participation 
in international fora; these policies have been illuminated as the result of reporting 
obligations under international agreements. Under the UNFCCC, countries are divided 
into Annex I, Annex II, and non-Annex I countries; as a developing country, Mongolia is 
labeled a non-Annex I party.287  Non-Annex I parties are required to submit two 
documents regularly to the UNFCCC Secretariat: National Communications (NCs) and 
Biennial Update Reports (BURs). National Communications are submitted by countries 
                                               
285 Mongolia’s Initial Biennial Update Report, 72; Strategies for Development of Green Energy Systems in 
Mongolia: Final Report (Ulaanbaatar: Global Green Growth Institute, March 2014), x. 
286 Strategies for Development of Green Energy Systems in Mongolia: Final Report, 25. 
287 Countries that are party to the UNFCCC are divided into Annex I and non-Annex I parties. Annex I 
parties include industrialized countries “that were members of the OECD . . . in 1992,” as well as other 
countries that, at the time, were considered having economies in transition (e.g. Russia, the Baltic States, 
and select countries in Central and Eastern Europe).  
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every four years after joining the Convention.288 In 2017, at the Conference of Parties 
(COP) 17,289 countries decided that non-Annex I countries would also submit BURs in 
addition to NCs. BURs contain updates of a nation’s GHG inventories as well as “a 
national inventory report and information on mitigation actions, needs and support 
received.”290  
According to Mongolia’s Biennial Update Report, submitted to the UNFCCC 
Secretariat in August 2017, if Mongolia fully implements the actions described in its 
national programs to mitigate GHG emissions, emissions could be reduced by about 25% 
by 2025 and about 28% by 2030. Two of Mongolia’s main strategies to mitigate GHG 
emissions include increasing energy efficiency and the share of renewable energy, 
creating additional pressure on the regime to incorporate renewable energy technologies 
and phase out aging, inefficient systems.291 
Mongolia’s communications to the UNFCCC are coordinated and organized by the 
Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), including its NCs, BURs, and GHG 
inventory—all with the goal of incorporating issues related to climate change in all 
sectors.292 
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Due to the fact that the Kyoto Protocol targets the emissions of developed (rather than 
developing) countries, non-Annex I parties do not have reporting requirements under the 
Protocol.293 In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement requires all parties to 
submit reporting to the UNFCCC. As specified in Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Paris 
Agreement, each party to the Agreement is required to “prepare, communicate, and 
maintain successive nationally determined contributions,” referred to as NDCs—
countries’ “post-2020 climate actions.”294 As a party to the Agreement, Mongolia 
submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) in September of 2015 
to the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.295  
Following the conclusion of COP 18 in Doha in 2012, parties agreed that developing 
country parties will take Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)—
classified as “any action that that reduces emissions in developing countries and is 
prepared under the umbrella of a national governmental initiative.”296 Mongolia 
submitted its NAMAs to the UNFCCC Secretariat in 2010.297 The NAMAs that 
Mongolia submitted proposed 22 different options (Appendix B) for mitigation actions in 
six sectors—energy supply, building, industry, transportation, agriculture, and forestry.298 
The UN additionally oversees optional mechanisms and tools that countries can 
utilize in conjunction with mandatory reporting to further achieve sustainable 
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development goals. An optional resource facilitated by the UNFCCC for developing 
countries is a Technology Needs Assessment (TNA). TNAs are undertaken by 
developing countries to determine their climate technology priorities. The process began 
in 2001 and has evolved to include multiple intergovernmental partners that provide 
technical and methodological support to countries, such as the UNEP Danish Technical 
University Partnership and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). One of the crucial 
outcomes of a TNA is the development of country-specific technology action plans 
(TAPs)—concise, technology-specific plans to facilitate the uptake and diffusion of 
technologies identified in the TNA that will assist in a country’s actions towards climate 
change mitigation and adaptation.299 
With the assistance of multiple international organizations, Mongolia completed a 
TNA in 2013 and credits funding of the document to the GEF. UNEP, the UNEP-Risoe 
Centre, and the Regional Centre Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, are additionally 
mentioned. The report does clarify that the project resulted from a “fully country-led 
process,” overseen by Mongolia’s Ministry of Environment and Green Development.300 
In Mongolia’s TNA, the energy sector was identified as the primary contributor to the 
country’s GHG emissions; thus, multiple technologies with the potential to decrease 
Mongolia’s GHG emissions were identified. These technologies were presented to 
relevant stakeholders (Appendix A), who were asked to categorize each based on a score 
of variables. The three technologies prioritized following an assessment of each’s costs 
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and benefits were large-scale hydropower plants, wind turbines, and pulverized coal 
combustion technologies.301 
IV.2.4 Socio-Cultural 
In addition to regime tensions arising from technological limitations of Mongolia’s 
existing energy infrastructure, numerous social pressures have led the Mongolian 
Government to explore the implementation of alternative energy sources. Addressing 
social inequalities has historically driven the Government of Mongolia’s (GoM) efforts to 
introduce sustainable energy technologies, specifically the issue of insufficient energy 
access. In 2001, the GoM approved the Sustainable Energy Sector Development Strategy 
Plan (2002-2010) to expand energy access to rural herding communities. The plan 
detailed the reform of soum electricity markets as well as the development of diesel-
renewable energy hybrid systems.302 The lack of feasibility of connecting rural herding 
families to centralized grid systems led the GoM to explore self-sustaining systems, 
specifically in the form of small-scale renewable energy systems. 
Moreover, negative externalities arising as the result of an overreliance on coal has 
further pushed the GoM to explore sustainable energy options. Air pollution has grown 
rapidly in Mongolia, particularly in the capital Ulaanbaatar, as more people migrate from 
the countryside to the city. Many of these people elect to live in traditional Mongolian 
structures, gers, which are portable homes utilized by the nomadic population; over 60% 
of Ulaanbaatar’s population live in the ger districts, neighborhoods composed of gers. 
Inside the gers, stoves burn fuel (coal, wood, dung) to provide heat; in the city, this fuel is 
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primarily coal for its longer-burning duration and lack of access to animals for the use of 
dung. It is these coal stoves that contribute primarily to Ulaanbaatar’s air pollution.303 
Complications from air pollution are responsible for 10% of all deaths in Ulaanbaatar.304 
In 2017, the Government of Mongolia approved the National Program on the 
Reduction of Air and Environmental Pollution.305 In May 2019, a ban on burning raw 
coal, which is primarily used to heat gers, will go into place. This ban is part of the 
government’s efforts to focus on improving, rather than unrealistically prohibiting, coal 
use in the ger districts; residents will be required to replace raw coal with refined coal.306 
The issue of air pollution has gained further traction with renewable energy proponents. 
In addition to the Government of Mongolia, various NGOs and CSOs actively advocate 
for increasing renewable energy use as a means of combatting air pollution.307 
Civil society organizations (CSOs) and NGOs exist throughout Mongolia and are 
primarily located in Ulaanbaatar. According to Mongolians familiar with the energy 
industry and renewable energy development, NGOs and CSOs working specifically on 
the issue of citizen engagement with renewable energy are limited. In 2017, the 
Mongolian Wind Energy Association was renamed to become the Mongolian 
Renewables Industries Association (MRIA) with the purpose of generally supporting the 
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growth of renewable energy (as opposed to solely promoting wind energy).308 MRIA’s 
members are comprised of numerous companies involved in the renewable energy 
industry, including both Mongolian companies as well as their international partners—as 
of March 2019, the page listed 34 such companies.309 MRIA is now responsible for 
organizing Mongolia’s National Renewable Energy Forum (NREF), which takes place 
every May. The NREF has been critical in expanding Mongolians’ knowledge about 
ongoing and future renewable energy projects; being open to the public, the Forum grows 
in attendance with every year.310 
Regarding education, Mongolia is working to increase public knowledge and 
awareness about its sustainable development agenda. Curricula for secondary schools in 
Mongolia are shifting to include a Sustainable Development Education program.311 
Public perceptions about renewable energy have evolved in conjunction with the makeup 
of Mongolia’s renewable energy systems. Before the widespread construction of large-
scale renewable facilities, renewable energy would evoke thoughts of small, single-
household systems—a consequence of the 100,000 Solar Gers program. As publicity has 
grown showcasing the construction and implementation of large-scale systems, 
perceptions have shifted.312 
GGGI has also been active in campaigns to increase the Mongolian public’s 
knowledge about sustainable development issues. GGGI released a series of videos in 
                                               
308 “About Us,” Mongolian Renewables Industries Association, accessed March 20, 2019, 
http://en.mria.mn/about-us-copy. 
309 “Members,” Mongolian Renewables Industries Association, accessed March 20, 2019, 
http://en.mria.mn/membersen. 
310 Anonymous, multiple (ADB, GGGIa, GGGIb, Green Energy), interview by author, Ulaanbaatar, March 
18-22, 2019. 
311 Third National Communication of Mongolia Under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 51. 
312 Anonymous (ADB), interview by author, Ulaanbaatar, March 18, 2019. 
 
 
89 
2018 aimed at secondary school-aged children to educate them on issues such as air 
pollution and energy efficiency. GGGI partnered with the Mongolian Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism, as well as the Ulaanbaatar city government, to disseminate the 
videos to eco clubs in the country.313 
 
IV.3 Barriers to Further Regime Change 
IV.3.1 Technological 
There are significant barriers at the regime level to successfully increasing 
Mongolia’s renewable energy capacity. Despite Mongolia’s recognition that electricity 
and energy will be critical in meeting GHG emission reduction goals, the electricity and 
heat sectors face problems of insufficient funding, low coal quality, and the use of 
obsolete technologies and techniques.314  
IV.3.2 Markets and Finances 
Although the government has worked diligently to adequately equip investors and 
project managers with laws to support renewable energy projects, there is still 
uncertainty. Because no criteria exist to reject applications for renewable energy licenses 
if renewable energy levels in an area are exceeded, it is possible for project developers to 
be granted a license but be unable to proceed with the project. Thus, developers may 
invest to secure a license only to be unable to recover their investments.315 
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Mongolia’s economy has been rife with volatility since the country transitioned from 
a communist country to a democratic country with a market economy in 1990. Soviet 
assistance “disappeared almost overnight in 1990 and 1991,” resulting in widespread 
economic and social chaos.316 During the transition, there was 
scant concern for proper training in the rule of law, a solid banking system, 
appreciation of contracts, government officials’ understanding of the need for a strict 
division between their public responsibilities and their private commercial gains, and 
stringent rules curtailing nepotism and favoritism, generated considerable profiteering 
and corruption.317 
 
Many of these problems continue to persist in some form today. The current Government 
of Mongolia has “limited capacity to financially support investment projects in important 
sectors, most notably, energy, mining, and agriculture; and must rely on FDI [foreign 
direct investment] to support its broad economic and development agendas.”318 
Mongolia’s economic conditions are highly reliant on the status of the country’s 
mining sector. In 2016, the sector accounted for 85% of Mongolia’s exports, 21% of its 
GDP, and over 30% of the national budget revenue. Two projects in the mining sector, 
the OT copper-gold project and the Tavan Tolgoi coking coal project, are expected to 
drive Mongolia’s GDP for the next multiple decades. OT specifically is projected, at full 
capacity, to produce close to 3% of the world’s copper output.319 Between 2004 and 
2008, GDP growth in Mongolia was around 9% on account of both gold production and 
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global copper prices.320 In 2009, despite passing legislation to develop the massive OT 
copper and gold mine with Anglo-Australian multinational mining company Rio Tinto, 
Mongolia’s economy slowed significantly after investors lost confidence due to a 
“dispute with foreign investors.”321 While investor confidence was largely restored in 
2015 after the country formalized an agreement with Rio Tinto to restart the development 
of OT, the economy has still faced struggled significantly. GDP growth in Mongolia 
peaked at 17.3% in 2011 and sharply fell in subsequent years as a result of the global 
recession and the resulting decline in commodity prices, reaching 1.2% in 2016 (Figure 
10).322 
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Fig. 10. Annual GDP of Mongolia (1982-2017) (Data from World Bank, 2017). 
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Due to the volatility of Mongolia’s economic system and the reliance placed on its 
mining sector, Mongolia has received significant financial support from various 
international organizations. At the end of 2016, the Mongolian government prepared an 
“Economic Recovery Program,” approaching the IMF for additional financial assistance. 
The Program aims to, among multiple objectives, promote economic diversification, 
“protect the most vulnerable in society,” and strengthen the financial sector.323 Since 
Mongolia’s democratic transition, the country has received multiple funding packages 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as financial assistance from allies. 
The IMF and Mongolia reached a $236 million Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) in 2009, 
helping Mongolia to strengthen its banking sector and fiscal management.324 The IMF’s 
SBA allows countries to receive financing from the IMF during an economic crisis, and 
allows for a quick response to address balance of payments problems. SBAs are typically 
distributed for short-term balance of payments problems, rather than longer-term.325 
In April 2017, the IMF approved a three-year extended arrangement under the 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Mongolia, with Mongolia’s total financing package 
from the IMF, World Bank, ADB, Japan, and Korea totaling about $5.5 billion.326 IMF 
assistance under an EFF is usually reserved for countries facing “medium-term balance of 
payments problems because of structural weaknesses.” As opposed to SBAs, EFF 
assistance aims to address structural and pervasive underlying problems within a 
country’s financing regime. Countries borrowing from the IMF under an EFF commit to 
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implementing policies to ameliorate structural economic problems. In order to assure 
countries are on track with stated goals, the IMF regularly assesses countries’ 
performance and is able to adjust the EFF as necessary.327 Most recently, in October 
2018, the IMF Executive Board conducted its Fifth Review of Mongolia’s EFF.328  
In addition to the IMF, the United States has been active in distributing financial 
assistance to Mongolia for decades. Notably, Mongolia received a $285 million aid 
package from the Millennium Challenge Corporation to be carried out from 2008-2013, 
“focused on property rights, vocational education, health, road infrastructure, and energy 
and the environment.” Mongolia was approved to receive a second aid package from the 
MCC in December 2014 worth $345 million.329 
IV.3.3 Political 
Like many developing countries, the efficacy political system in Mongolia is hindered 
by public perceptions, corruption, and limited institutional capacity. After falling to the 
Manchu Qing dynasty in 1636, Mongolia declared independence in 1911. Yet even after 
this declaration, the government of China still considered present-day Mongolia, or 
“Outer Mongolia,” part of China, invading the country in 1919. Mongolia became a 
socialist country in 1921 after expelling the Chinese with the aid of Russia’s Red Army; 
from 1920 to 1990, Mongolia was under single-party communist rule. The democratic 
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revolution that led to the political system Mongolia has now began in 1990. With this 
democratic transition also began Mongolia’s transition to a market economy.330  
There are three primary political parties in Mongolia—the Mongolian People’s 
Revolutionary Party (MPRP), the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), and the Democratic 
Party (DP)—with self-professed orientations of left, center-left, and center-right. Despite 
these orientations, in practice, ideological distinctions are “practically indiscernible.”331 
The MPRP was founded in 1924, and Article 82 of Mongolia’s original constitution 
described the Party as a “guiding force” as well as the “vanguard of the working people” 
until the article was abolished in 1990.332  
Mongolia’s political system is plagued by rampant corruption, which remains a 
prominent problem for both foreigners conducting business in Mongolia and Mongolian 
citizens. Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked 
Mongolia 103 out of 180 countries, with a score of 36 out of a possible 100—a decrease 
from its peak of 39 in 2015 and 2014.333 The 2006 Anti-Corruption Law sets criminal 
penalties for official corruption, but the law continues to be poorly enforced, with 
contributing factors including “conflicts of interest, lack of transparency, lack of access to 
information, an inadequate civil service system, and weak government control of key 
institutions.” A National Program to Combat Corruption was approved by Parliament in 
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2016, along with the initiation of Mongolia’s second National Action Plan under the 
Open Government Partnership.334  
Investigation of corruption cases is primarily conducted by Mongolia’s Independent 
Authority Against Corruption, with assistance from the National Police Agency’s 
Organized Crime Department.335 As noted by the Department of State in its annual 
Human Rights Report, “Members of parliament are immune from prosecution during 
their tenures.”336 
Citizens’ faith in the current government’s ability to address corruption is limited; a 
report from the Asia Foundation found that only 11% of respondents believe the 
government elected in 2016 will improve on corruption while 21.3% think the 
administration will be worse than the previous.337 The percentage of individuals who 
view corruption as a major problem increased to 11.8% in 2018 compared to 9.9% in 
2017, although a majority of respondents view unemployment (33.2%) as a major 
problem.338 The percentage of individuals who respond that they agree that “corruption is 
a common practice in our country” increased in 2018 to 75.8%, from 70.1% in 2017.339 
While it is not possible to directly link corruption to election turnout, turnout in 
Mongolia’s presidential election has generally decreased since the country’s first 
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democratic presidential election in 1993 (Figure 11). 
 
Mongolia’s most recent presidential election took place in 2017 and involved two 
rounds of voting after no candidate received a majority in the first round; a notable 8.23% 
of individuals cast blank ballots in the second round (compared to 1.37% in the first) as a 
form of protest.340 Khaltmaa Battulga, candidate from the DP, won the 2017 presidential 
election with 50.61% of the vote.341 
In addition to corruption, high turnover consistently impedes the efficacy of the 
Mongolian government (GoM). According to interviews with individuals working for 
organizations that partner with the GoM, this translates to slower progress on projects and 
unpredictability regarding who long-term government counterparts may be.342 Despite 
rampant corruption and persistent bureaucratic challenges, Mongolia is still heralded as a 
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democratic success story by many in the international community. In 2016, former U.S. 
Secretary of State John Kerry referred to Mongolia as an “oasis of democracy” given its 
two communist neighbors.343 
An additional challenge is the separation between agencies tasked with implementing 
related policies. Within the Mongolian government, multiple agencies are responsible for 
formulating and implementing policies related to the environment. Regarding Mongolia’s 
intended nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement, the various 
ministries listed include the MET, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of 
Construction and Urban Development, Ministry of Road and Transport, and Ministry of 
Agriculture.344 In 2012, the MET (formerly the Ministry of Environment and Green 
Development) was elevated to be one of the four core ministries within the government, 
signifying the ministry’s increased importance.345 Within ministries, various committees 
and offices have been established to address climate change adaptation; however, these 
smaller bodies have been subject to political volatility. For example, following the 
passage of the Law on Air in 2012, the government established a National Climate 
Committee to coordinate sectoral efforts on climate change as well as the Climate 
Change Coordination Office (CCCO), tasked with coordinating UNFCCC responsibilities 
and general oversight pertaining to laws and regulations, within the Ministry of 
Environment and Green Development. Due to political turnover, the CCCO was 
dissolved in 2015, only for the Ministry of Environment, Green Development, and 
                                               
343 Yeganeh Torbati, “Kerry Hails Mongolia as ‘oasis of Democracy’ in Tough Neighborhood,” Reuters, 
June 5, 2016, accessed February 20, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mongolia-
idUSKCN0YR02T. 
344 “INDC - Submissions.” 
345 Third National Communication of Mongolia Under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 380. 
 
 
98 
Tourism to establish the Climate Change Project Implementing Unit based largely on 
former CCCO staff.346 
IV.3.4 Socio-Cultural 
Mongolia’s climate produces unique challenges for energy technology production. 
Energy efficiency in Mongolia depends both on operating and technology practices as 
well as the country’s climatic variation.347  
Moreover, while public awareness of renewable energy projects has increased, 
knowledge is still limited. Given that renewable energy has been presented as an avenue 
for addressing a wide swath of societal issues, supporters are ideologically fragmented, 
necessitating multi-faceted campaigns that are often uncoordinated.348 
 
IV.4 Divergence from the Multi-Level Perspective 
The ways in which Mongolia’s energy transition diverge from the traditional path 
outlined by the MLP are especially visible at the regime level. Most prominently, 
divergence occurs regarding the presence of transnational actors and donor interventions, 
the state of Mongolia’s incumbent regime, and normative framing of the ongoing 
transition. Whereas energy transitions in developed countries have been and continue to 
be led by domestic agencies and actors, Mongolia’s transition, in a similar manner to 
many in the global South, is highly dependent on transnational linkages and actors. 
Moreover, the presence of intermediaries has enabled the Government of Mongolia to 
both initiate and see to fruition projects that would be domestically unfeasible.  
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The current state of Mongolia’s regime is similarly in line with that of other 
developing, rather than developed, countries. Mongolia’s coal-fired power plants are far 
from highly functional, echoing the aforementioned state of disrepair and dilapidation 
that often applies to incumbent systems in the global South.349 
Finally, the normative conversations driving Mongolia’s energy transition occupy a 
starkly different space than is to be expected from developed countries’ transitions.350 
Framing renewable energy as a potential mitigation technique for air pollution is 
reflective of the fact that developing countries often face much more pressing issues than 
being existentially environmental. Where “sustainability” as an abstract concept fails to 
gain traction as a primary motivator for the adoption of renewable energy systems, air 
pollution amelioration is a concrete and imaginable societal ideal. 
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Chapter V: Niche Level 
V.1 Drivers of Niche Momentum 
V.1.1 Technological 
Niche technologies, such as solar photovoltaic (PV) panels and wind turbines, were 
first introduced in Mongolia through the “100,000 Solar Gers” program. Small-scale PV 
systems were initially distributed throughout the Mongolian countryside to nomadic 
herder families in 2000, when the Government of Mongolia began the program with the 
aim of increasing the country’s overall electricity access by providing 100,000 portable 
solar home systems to herder families. Prior to “100,000 Solar Gers,” the vast majority of 
herders and Mongolia’s rural population lacked access to electricity. This lack of access, 
according to the World Bank, was primarily due to 
(i) high costs of household power systems coupled with low incomes of many herder 
households; (ii) substantial logistic difficulties of developing the supply chain to 
support a decentralized market for a small and mobile customer base spread over a 
vast landscape; and (iii) a nascent market which lacks basic quality and service 
standards.351 
 
By 2005, aided by grants from donor countries, the government had distributed over 
30,000 solar home systems to herder families.352 When the program began to plateau in 
2005, the government looked to international sources for assistance; in 2006, the World 
Bank agreed to assist through the Renewable Energy for Rural Access Project (REAP).353 
                                               
351 Renewable Energy for Rural Access Project (REAP) - Project Information Document Appraisal Stage 
(The World Bank, 2006), 2, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/288521468273887512/Project0Inform1nt010Appraisal0Stage.d
oc. 
352 “Mongolia: Portable Solar Power for Nomadic Herders,” last modified 2013, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/08/portable-solar-power-for-nomadic-herders. 
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The completion of Mongolia’s Technology Needs Assessment in 2013, which 
outlines actions it can take to both mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change, 
allowed for additional multiple niche technologies to be introduced and integrated into 
Mongolia’s industries. Considering that the energy sector is the largest producer of GHG 
emissions, the TNA specifically identified technologies that could mitigate GHG and 
contribute to social, environmental, and economic development.  
Mongolia’s TNA identifies many potential technologies for the energy supply 
subsector. After stakeholders reviewed the presented technologies, a shortlist was 
compiled (Table 7).354 
Table 7 
Shortlist of potential technologies for energy subsector (italicized items are those ultimately selected) (Adapted from 
Technology Needs Assessment, Volume 2, 29) (Ministry of Environment and Green Development, 2013a). 
Energy Service Category Technology 
Electricity 
supply 
Renewable 
energy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fossil fuels 
Large-scale dam-based hydro for electricity supply 
(more than 100MW) 
Medium-sized dam-based hydro for electricity supply 
(10-100MW) 
Pumped storage hydroelectricity 
Wind turbines – on-shore, large-scale 
Solar PV (off-grid, grid connected, solar home system) 
Solar thermal –CSP, central receiver tower, parabolic 
through collector and dish 
Carbon capture and storage 
Integrated coal gasification combined cycle 
Pulverized coal combustion with higher efficiency 
Heat supply Fossil fuel Heat-only boilers for space heating and domestic hot 
water 
 
In order to determine which technologies would be ideal for Mongolia to pursue, an 
assessment was created to score each technology based on its costs and expected 
economic, social, and environmental benefits. Costs included capital costs, operational 
and maintenance costs, and cost effectiveness of mitigation. Benefits included economic 
                                               
354 Technology Needs Assessment: Volume 2 - Climate Change Mitigation in Mongolia, 29. 
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(energy supply improvement, balance of payments), social (healthcare improvement), and 
environmental (reduced air pollution, GHG emission reduction by 2030). National 
consultants prepared Technological Fact Sheets (TFSs) for each of the shortlisted 
technologies that included information on the technology’s potential for reducing GHG 
emissions, how it might impact Mongolia’s development (economic, social, 
environmental, market) priorities, and costs. Using the information provided in the TFSs, 
identified stakeholders (Appendix A) scored each technology based on the 
aforementioned criteria. Any technology identified as the least preferred option for any 
category received a zero. Following the scoring process, each criterion was assigned a 
weighted value based on its importance.355 After scoring the above technologies based on 
projected costs and benefits, the top three selected were large-scale hydropower, wind 
turbines, and pulverized coal (PC) combustion technologies.356  
In order to facilitate the implementation of these three technologies, TAPs were 
developed for each technology. Each TAP outlines a description of the technology, the 
target for diffusion, current projects in progress, barriers to the technology’s diffusion, 
and proposed steps to implement the technology, broken down into economic and 
financial, policy and regulatory, network, and market.357 
Large-scale hydropower plants (HPPs) are classified as non-market public goods. 
They require immense investment and funding and are few in number. Approval for the 
construction of large-scale HPPs is granted by the government. The main barrier to 
implementing HPPs is Mongolia’s low electricity tariff, as any electricity generated by 
                                               
355 Ibid., 29–31. 
356 Ibid., 4–5. 
357 Ibid., 157. 
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HPPs with capacity greater than 5MW is not covered by the feed in tariff specified under 
Mongolia’s Renewable Energy Law. There are additional barriers to the development of 
large HPPs—politics being the main one.358 
The second priority technology identified by the TNA is large-scale wind park 
projects. For large-scale wind park projects, the most significant barrier is the capacity 
limit of Mongolia’s grid system.359 Wind propellers with a capacity of 50-100 watts 
provide power to about 30,000 households.360 Barriers defined in the TAP for large-scale 
wind turbines include economic and financial (high capital cost, inappropriate financial 
incentives, high transaction cost, lack of inadequate access to financial resources [sic]), 
technical (system constrain [sic]); network (weak connectivity between actors favoring 
the new technology, lack of involvement of stakeholders in decision-making); and policy, 
legal, and regulatory (policy intermittency and uncertainty, highly controlled energy 
sector, lack of professional institutions).361 
The final priority technology identified by Mongolia’s TNA for further development 
was pulverized coal (PC) thermal supercritical power plants. The inclusion of an option 
that utilizes coal is recognizant of the fact that while Mongolia’s large coal reserves make 
continuing to utilize coal a pragmatic choice, in order to reduce the environmental 
pollution that existing plants produce, Mongolia must look for an option that reduces the 
current externalities resulting from existing coal power plants. Pulverized coal thermal 
supercritical (or ultra-supercritical) power plants are a more efficient, environmentally 
                                               
358 Ibid., 72. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Third National Communication of Mongolia Under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 349. 
361 Technology Needs Assessment: Volume 2 - Climate Change Mitigation in Mongolia, 175–176. 
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friendly alternative to Mongolia’s existing coal-fired thermal power plants. Supercritical 
and ultra-supercritical plants allow for higher efficiency due to operating at higher steam 
temperatures and pressures—pollution levels are reduced as less coal per MWh produced 
is burned.362 As opposed to conventional PC power plants with an efficiency of around 
35%, ultra-supercritical plants can attain an efficiency level of 45%. This increase in 
efficiency is projected to decrease emissions of CO2 about 33%.363 
In addition to projects where only one renewable technology is developed, projects 
utilizing multiple renewable sources are also being explored. In September 2018, the 
Asian Development Bank approved a $40 million USD loan for the development of a 
41MW distributed renewable energy system. The system, the first of its kind in 
Mongolia, will utilize a variety of renewable energy sources in order to provide power 
and heating to remote regions in the country’s western regions. These regions currently 
rely on imported energy from Mongolia’s neighboring countries, which is highly 
expensive and carbon-intensive.364 
Mongolia’s utilization of international financing opportunities reflects a larger trend 
of Mongolia partnering with both countries and international organizations to advance 
renewable energy priorities. Mongolia has also been active in partnering with the 
government of Japan to implement renewable energy projects. Under Japan’s Joint 
Crediting Mechanism (JCM), inspired by the CDM and the Kyoto Protocol, Japan can 
implement projects in developing countries and receive credit towards its obligations 
                                               
362 Ibid. 
363 Ibid., 49. 
364 “ADB Supports First Distributed Renewable Energy System in Mongolia,” Text, Asian Development 
Bank, last modified September 21, 2018, accessed October 30, 2018, https://www.adb.org/news/adb-
supports-first-distributed-renewable-energy-system-mongolia. 
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under the Kyoto Protocol. Mongolia was the first country to sign a JCM bilateral 
agreement with Japan in 2013; as of September 2018, there are 17 countries that have 
since signed JCM bilateral agreements. 365 There are five CDM-registered projects in 
Mongolia: the Salkhit wind farm, the Durgun hydropower project, the Taishir 
hydropower project, a retrofit program for heating stations, and MicroEnergy credits.366  
V.1.2 Markets and Finances 
One of the primary catalysts for Mongolia’s renewable energy transition has been 
transnational support in the form of donor interventions. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
has been increasingly active in Mongolia, providing financing for projects addressing a 
wide swath of sustainable development priorities. In 2016, the GCF approved a project in 
order to enable Mongolian bank XacBank to better support loans sought by Mongolian 
businesses investing in renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. The project’s 
impetus arose from the large majority of Mongolian businesses that rely on outdated and 
inefficient equipment and thus emit high levels of GHGs. Ultimately, the project seeks to 
foster the implementation of long-term low-carbon systems to allow businesses to lower 
financial costs and reduce their environmental impacts. Total investment for the project is 
$60 million USD, split between the GCF, the Global Climate Partnership Fund (GCPF), 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and Developing World 
Markets (DWM). 367 The GCPF is a public-private partnership established in 2009 by the 
German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and 
                                               
365 “Introduction of the Joint Crediting Mechanism” (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, October 8, 
2018), accessed November 4, 2018, http://www.mne.mn/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/20181012-Brief-
Intro-JCM-Eng.pdf. 
366 Mongolia’s Initial Biennial Update Report, 40. 
367 “FP028 Business Loan Programme for GHG Emissions Reduction,” Text, Green Climate Fund, last 
modified April 28, 2018, accessed March 10, 2019, https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/fp028. 
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Nuclear Safety as well as German bank KfW Entwicklungsbank; the Fund’s goal is to 
mitigate climate change by supporting GHG reduction in emerging and developing 
markets.368 Founded in 1994, DWM is an investment manager dedicated to emerging and 
frontier markets.369 
Financing for Mongolia’s renewable energy projects is increasingly shifting towards 
being locally, as opposed to internationally, driven. After becoming the first private entity 
in a developing country to receive accreditation from the GCF in 2016, Mongolian bank 
XacBank signed an agreement with the GCF in November 2017 to utilize GCF funds in 
order to become the first local bank to finance the construction of a large-scale solar plant 
within the country.370 XacBank has since been approved by the GCF to finance two 
projects in Mongolia.371 
In March 2018, the GCF approved a project to create eco-districts in Ulaanbaatar in 
order to form zones throughout the city that are climate resilient, low-carbon, and 
affordable. In a similar vein to the GCF’s other projects, funding is also being provided 
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Total investment for the project is $544 million 
                                               
368 “ResponsAbility Takes over the Management of the Global Climate Partnership Fund,” Global Climate 
Partnership Fund, last modified November 20, 2014, accessed March 10, 2019, https://www.gcpf.lu/press-
release-detail/responsability-takes-over-the-management-of-the-global-climate-partnership-fund.html. 
369 “Our History,” Developing World Markets, n.d., accessed March 10, 2019, 
https://www.dwmarkets.com/our-history/. 
370 “XacBank Proudly Becomes an Accredited Entity of the Green Climate Fund (GCF),” XacBank, last 
modified December 2016, accessed March 6, 2019, https://www.xacbank.mn/article/817?lang=en; 
“XacBank First Mongolian Bank to Finance Renewable Energy,” Text, Green Climate Fund, last modified 
November 11, 2017, accessed February 21, 2019, https://www.greenclimate.fund/news/xacbank-first-
mongolian-bank-to-finance-renewable-energy. 
371 “Mongolia Technology Review Opens Way to Cut Emissions,” UNFCCC, last modified October 23, 
2017, accessed March 1, 2019, https://unfccc.int/news/mongolia-technology-review-opens-way-to-cut-
emissions. 
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USD.372 Another GCF project was approved in October 2018 to provide loans to 
Mongolian households for the installation of energy efficient appliances and housing 
structures. With a total project investment of $21.5 million USD, co-financing for the 
project is also provided by XacBank, as well as through a grant from French NGO 
Groupe Energies Renouvelables, Environnement et Solidarités.373 In addition to 
Mongolia-specific projects, other GCF projects encompassing a range of developing 
countries also involve Mongolia. These projects address various GCF target areas and 
involve countries sharing traits with Mongolia’s own development.374 
V.1.3 Political 
The niche level is also characterized by the implementation of novel policies. Newell 
describes niche developments as including policies in addition to technologies if the 
policies are initiated by landscape-level actors—for instance, a donor-funded feed-in-
tariff would be considered a niche policy.375 As Mongolia continues to develop 
economically, niche policies have been implemented to better address issues such as 
investment and competition. A small number of these policies relate both directly and 
indirectly to the development of renewable energy technologies, such as Mongolia’s 
feed-in-tariff (FiT). Mongolia implemented a FiT in 2014, but was unsuccessful. The 
                                               
372 “FP077 Ulaanbaatar Green Affordable Housing and Resilient Urban Renewal Project (AHURP),” Text, 
Green Climate Fund, last modified June 27, 2018, accessed March 10, 2019, 
https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/fp077. 
373 “SAP004 Energy Efficient Consumption Loan Programme,” Text, Green Climate Fund, last modified 
January 30, 2019, accessed March 10, 2019, https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/sap004; “Funding 
Proposal SAP004: Energy Efficient Consumption Loan Program” (Green Climate Fund, November 28, 
2018), 3. 
374 Green Climate Fund, “Mongolia - Country Profiles,” Text, Green Climate Fund, accessed March 10, 
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375 Newell and Phillips, “Neoliberal Energy Transitions in the South,” 45. 
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amended Law on Renewable Energy, passed in 2015, sought to replace the FiT with a 
feed-in premium.376  
In 2015, Mongolia’s parliament passed a new Value-Added Tax (VAT) Act to 
replace the existing VAT law, which had been in effect since 2006. The Act aims to more 
accurately reflect the evolution of various sectors in Mongolia and economic 
development strides that the previous law did not adequately account for.377 Within the 
act, a number of sectors and goods are named exempt from the VAT Act, including 
“equipment to be used for renewable energy surveying, research and production along 
with the accompanying devices and parts.”378 Interviewees credited the VAT law changes 
with drawing in critical actors necessary for funding and implementing large-scale 
renewable energy systems.379 
A presentation from the head of Mongolia’s Ministry of Energy’s Investment and 
Production Division in October 2018 describes additional laws that the country has 
implemented or amended to promote the development of regional energy systems. These 
include the Concession Law (2010), Investment Law (2013), Amendment to the Law on 
Energy (2015), Amendment to the Law on Renewable Energy (2015), and Amendments 
to the Custom Law and Tariff Laws (2015).380 Interviewees were unable to recall if the 
                                               
376 Emiliano Bellini, “Solar Gains Ground in Mongolia,” PV Magazine International, last modified January 
29, 2019, accessed February 21, 2019, https://www.pv-magazine.com/2019/01/29/solar-gains-ground-in-
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377 “Mongolia Adopts New VAT Law,” EY, last modified September 2, 2015, accessed March 6, 2019, 
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378 “Translation of Value-Added Tax (VAT) Act of 2015,” Deloitte, last modified 2018, accessed March 6, 
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government initiated the passage of these laws, or if international organizations were 
responsible, but they did speak to the effectiveness of these amendments to bring an 
influx of foreign investment towards development of additional renewable energy 
systems.381 Regarding the implementation of additional niche policy interventions, 
multiple interviewees spoke about the prospects of auctioning. Opinions differed on 
whether or not auctioning would be realistic. One interviewee did note that within the 
past year, Parliament had discussed the inclusion of amendments to the Renewable 
Energy Law but that these amendments were not approved.382 
In addition to driving much of the momentum behind the development of projects 
utilizing niche technologies, international actors are also responsible for the realization 
and construction of these projects. Construction of Mongolia’s large-scale renewable 
energy facilities, particularly solar and wind, has been initiated and overseen by various 
multinational corporations. There has so far been a pattern for the trajectory of large-scale 
renewable projects: international organizations or governments secure funding and 
resources necessary for the projects, a Mongolian partner company is identified (or 
established for the purpose of the project), and the project proceeds as a partnership 
between both Mongolian and external actors. 
                                                                                                                                            
-1stNov 2018, Ulaanbaatar, October 31, 2018), accessed March 6, 2019, 
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In September 2018, President of Mongolia Khaltmaagiin Battulga urged the 
commencement of the Asia Super Grid’s second phase, the East Asia Super Grid, which 
would connect across Japan as well as South Korea and China.383 
V.1.4 Socio-Cultural 
Regarding where Mongolia could potentially locate large-scale wind and solar energy 
production, the Gobi Desert—with high wind resources, low moisture and temperatures, 
and 300 days of sunshine per year—has been identified as an optimal location.384 
Compared to other desert areas, the Gobi Desert offers more efficient energy 
production.385 Potential energy production from the Gobi desert area is five times greater 
than the annual world power demand in 2015.386 The Gobi Desert’s renewable energy 
potential has inspired the Gobitec concept, a proposal to connect the Gobi desert area 
with locations of high energy demand.387 Eventually, the Gobitec project would be able 
to transmit energy produced through the ASG. Similar to the Gobitec project is the 
DESERTEC project, which would deploy renewable energy produced in the Middle East 
and North Africa to both meet domestic demand and, using any electricity surplus, supply 
electricity to Europe. 388 
In order for the full ASG to be realized, the cooperation of all countries involved as 
well as multiple intergovernmental organizations is critical. Intergovernmental 
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organizations will likely include: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), 
the Asian Development Bank, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP), the International Renewable Energy Agency, and the Energy Charter 
(EC). Existing challenges to the ASG include the need for an improved investment 
climate (due to the project’s capital-intensive nature), regional electricity, stability, and 
improved property rights (on account of Mongolia and China’s existing weak protection 
of intellectual property rights).389 
In addition to the benefit of being able to sell electricity to other nations, Mongolia 
will be able to reap many tangible benefits from the creation of the ASG. These include 
economic benefits (job creation, diversification of the local economy), social benefits 
(poverty alleviation, improved infrastructure), and environmental benefits (reduced air 
pollution, protection of natural environment). It is estimated that between wind and solar 
technologies, the project will generate an income greater than nine billion USD over a 
16-year period in Mongolia. Job diversification will come from the introduced renewable 
energy technologies industry, allowing for reduced dependency on Mongolia’s mining 
industry for jobs.390 
 
V.2 Existing Niche-Innovations 
Figure 12 details renewable energy projects both in operation and planned throughout  
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Fig. 12. Renewable energy projects in operation and planned (Jambaa, 2018). 
Mongolia. As of July 2017, there were eight different renewable energy license holders: 
Sainshand Wind Park LLC, AB Solar Wind, Aidiner Global, Cleantech, Clean Energy 
Asia, Desert Solar Power Wind, Huduggiin tsahilgaan, and the Ulaanbaatar Usan tseneg 
power plant. The total capacity of these license holders is 642.4 MW.391 Renewable 
energy in Mongolia exists in the form of hydropower plants, wind turbines, and 
photovoltaic (PV) systems.  
V.2.1 Wind Energy Systems 
Wind power systems have rapidly increased in Mongolia since the country’s first 
large-scale non-hydro renewable energy facility, the Salkhit wind farm, became 
operational in 2013.392 Multiple additional large-scale wind energy facilities are planned 
for construction across Mongolia, including a wind farm planned to supply 52 MW of 
electricity generation capacity, set to begin commission in 2017 and located in Sainshand, 
a town in the Gobi Desert.393  
                                               
391 D. Oyun, “Energy Sector of Mongolia, Policy and Challenges” (Government of Mongolia, Ministry of 
Energy, July 2017). 
392 Chen, Gönül, and Tumenjargal, Mongolia: Renewables Readiness Assessment, 7. 
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Salkhit. The Salkhit wind farm was the first large-scale wind farm to be constructed 
in Mongolia. Financing for the wind farm was provided by multiple international 
organizations and governments. Debt and equity funding for the project was provided in 
part by the EBRD.394 Clean Energy LLC, the Mongolian company that oversaw the 
construction of the Salkhit wind farm, was established in 2004. Owners of Clean Energy 
include Newcom LLC (51%, Mongolian), General Electric (21%, American), the EBRD 
(14%), and the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO, 14%).395 Turbines 
powering the Salkhit wind farm were manufactured by GE.396   
Sainshand. In 2009, the Mongolian company Sainshand Salkhin Park LLC was 
established for the construction of the Sainshand wind farm, in the Sainshand soum, 
Dornogovi aimag.397 The Sainshand wind farm is sponsored by Ferrostaal (German 
project developer), ENGIE (French energy company), Danish Climate Investment Fund, 
and a Mongolian entrepreneur (Radnaabazar Davaanyam). The European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and the EBRD are providing long-term financing for the project. 398 On 
September 17, 2018, the Sainshand wind farm was connected to Mongolia’s energy grid. 
Sponsors contributed $120 million to fund the project, which was completed by CMEC 
                                               
394 Svitlana Pyrkalo, “Salkhit Wind Farm in Mongolia Starts Production; EBRD Ready to Double Funding 
for Wind,” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, last modified June 20, 2013, accessed 
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modified November 17, 2011, accessed February 1, 2019, https://www.genewsroom.com/press-releases/ge-
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114 
Corporation of China.399 The company overseeing construction of the Sainshand wind 
farm, Clean Energy Asia (CEA) LLC, is a joint venture that was founded in 2012 by 
Newcom LLC and the renewable energy arm of Japan’s SoftBank Group, SB Energy 
Corporation. CEA is 51% owned by Newcom, 49% owned by SB Energy Corp.400 
Mongolia’s Technology Needs Assessment completed in 2013 reviews the possibility of 
constructing a wind farm in Sainshand, including the project’s objectives, how it would 
align with Mongolia’s sustainable development priorities, technical aspects, as well as 
potential challenges. Challenges include transportation of equipment, as well as 
incentivizing technology transfer and transaction costs. The Ministry of Energy is 
referenced as being responsible for coordinating and overseeing relationships with private 
companies and international financing organizations.401 The turbines used in the 
Sainshand Wind Park are manufactured by Vestas, a Danish company.402 
Tsetsii. A partnership between Japan and the EBRD, the Japan-EBRD Cooperation 
Fund, provided Mongolia with a $750,000 grant to modernize an electricity substation 
near the future site of the Tsetsii wind farm. In addition to Mongolian company Newcom, 
Japanese company SoftBank group is developing the Tsetsii wind farm. The EBRD, 
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along with Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is planning to co-finance the 
project.403 
Choir. The Choir wind farm is being overseen by the Aydiner Group, a Turkish 
company.404 
V.2.2 Solar Energy Systems 
In addition to wind energy systems, both small- and large-scale solar photovoltaic 
(PV) systems exist in Mongolia. Since the initiation of 100,000 Solar Gers, the focus on 
solar PV in Mongolia has shifted to large-scale systems, as foreign governments and 
investors have begun initiating and developing large-scale projects.  
Darkhan: Mongolia’s first large-scale solar farm is located in Darkhan, a city north of 
Ulaanbaatar. The solar farm has a capacity of 10MW, and went into operation on January 
1, 2017. Solar modules for the plant were provided by the Japanese company SHARP 
Corporation.405 In addition to PV modules provided by SHARP, German companies 
supplied additional equipment to ensure the plant would function in Mongolia’s extreme 
temperatures reaching -40˚C.406 The plant was jointly pursued by two Japanese 
companies—SHARP Corporation and Shigemitsu Shoji Co., Ltd.—and Mongolian 
                                               
403 Svitlana Pyrkalo, “Japan, EBRD Support Infrastructure for Renewables in Mongolia,” European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, last modified September 28, 2016, accessed February 1, 2019, 
//www.ebrd.com/news/2016/japan-ebrd-support-infrastructure-for-renewables-in-mongolia.html. 
404 “Establish a Wind Farm with a 50 Megawatt Capacity in Choibalsur Aimag Choir Soum,” National 
Renewable Energy Center of Mongolia, last modified May 7, 2017, accessed February 1, 2019, 
http://nrec.mn/?p=529. 
405 “First Large-Scale Solar Power Plant to Be Commissioned This Year,” JCM-MONGOLIA, accessed 
March 17, 2019, http://www.jcm-mongolia.com/?p=14887&lang=en. 
406 Oyundelger B., “Largest Solar Power Plant to Open Officially,” MONTSAME News Agency, last 
modified January 18, 2017, accessed March 18, 2019, https://montsame.mn/en/read/128372. 
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company Solar Power International.407 The project was registered under the JCM.408 
Solar Power International was founded in October 2015.409  
Monnaran: An additional project under the JCM is the Monnaran Project, a 
combination 10MW solar plant-agriculture system (referred to as Solar Farm® 
technology).410 Power generation, as well as operations and maintenance of the solar farm 
are overseen by Everyday Farm LLC, a joint venture pursued by Mongolian company 
Bridge Corporation and Japan company Farmdo LLC, established in 2012.411 Operations 
commenced on November 25, 2017, with construction beginning in 2015.412  
New Airport: The solar plant near Mongolia’s new international airport was financed 
partially by a loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the ADB’s first renewable 
energy loan with a company in Mongolia’s private sector.413 The New Airport project is a 
JCM project.414 Additional technical oversight and project sponsorship is being provided 
by Thai company Sermsang Power Corporation.415 Mongolian company Tenuun 
                                               
407 “Completion of Mongolia’s First Ever Large-Scale Solar Power Plant!,” SHARP Blog, last modified 
January 19, 2017, accessed March 17, 2019, http://www.sharp-world.com/blog/2017/01/19/9838/. 
408 “10MW Solar Power Project in Darkhan City,” The Joint Crediting Mechanism, accessed March 17, 
2019, http://gec.jp/jcm/projects/15pro_mgl_01/. 
409 “Tүүхэн Замнал,” Solar Power International Inc, accessed March 17, 2019, 
https://solarpowerinternational.mn/%d1%82%d2%af%d2%af%d1%85%d1%8d%d0%bd-
%d0%b7%d0%b0%d0%bc%d0%bd%d0%b0%d0%bb/. 
410 R. Jigjid, “JCM’s Contribution to Paradigm Shift (Solar Farm® Project in Mongolia)” (presented at the 
UNFCCC Subsidiary Body, Bonn, Germany, May 7, 2018), https://www.carbon-markets.go.jp/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/5_EverydayFarm.pdf. 
411 “Everyday Farm LLC,” Бридж Групп | Bridge Group, accessed April 15, 2019, 
http://www.bridgecorporation.mn/page/2229.shtml?sel=3713&subsel=3719&subid=3720. 
412 B. Batchimeg, “New 10 MW Solar Power Plant Commissions,” MONTSAME News Agency, last 
modified November 27, 2017, accessed April 15, 2019, https://montsame.mn/en/read/132534. 
413 Dulguun, “New Solar Power Project Sets Example to Draw Investors’ Attention,” The UB Post, last 
modified April 2, 2019, accessed April 15, 2019, http://theubposts.com/post/11671/. 
414 Sharp Energy Solutions Corporation, “Mega Solar Projects in Mongolia Under JCM Program” 
(presented at the Bilateral Business Matchmaking Event for the Joint Crediting Mechanism, Ulaanbaatar, 
November 7, 2018), accessed March 20, 2019, http://www.jcm-mongolia.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Sharp.pdf. 
415 “Sermsang Khushig Khundii Solar Project - Project Data Sheet,” Text, Asian Development Bank, last 
modified January 28, 2019, accessed April 15, 2019, https://www.adb.org/projects/52127-001/main. 
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Construction LLC is owned by Sermsang, Sharp Energy Solutions (Japan), AMOE Solar 
LLC (Mongolia), and SH Energy Solution LLC (Mongolia).416 
Sumber: The Sumber solar project was financed by Mongolian bank XacBank with 
assistance from the GCF.417 The Sumber solar plant is operated by Mongolian power 
company ESB, with technological input for the project provided by Japanese firm Sankou 
Seiki. The plant has a total of 31,000 solar panels and went into commission in January 
2019.418 
Other solar projects that are being pursued include a 10MW SPP in Choir, as well as 
a 15MW SPP in Zaminuud.419 
The Mongolian Government continues to expand its ability to initiate and implement 
projects related to sustainable development. Whereas projects coordinated through the 
UNDP were once solely direct implementation, increasingly projects are nationally 
implemented—the difference being UNDP versus GoM led, respectively.420 
 
V.3 Barriers to Further Niche Developments 
V.3.1 Technological 
                                               
416 “ADB Supports Private Sector Solar Power Development in Mongolia,” Text, Asian Development Bank, 
last modified March 20, 2019, accessed April 15, 2019, https://www.adb.org/news/adb-supports-private-
sector-solar-power-development-mongolia. 
417 “XacBank First Mongolian Bank to Finance Renewable Energy.” 
418 “GCF Helps XacBank Become First Mongolian Bank to Finance Large-Scale Solar,” Text, Green 
Climate Fund, last modified January 28, 2019, accessed February 28, 2019, 
https://www.greenclimate.fund/news/gcf-helps-xacbank-become-first-mongolian-bank-to-finance-large-
scale-solar; Batchimeg B., “Solar Power Plant in Sumber Soum Puts into Operation,” MONTSAME News 
Agency, last modified January 30, 2019, accessed February 28, 2019, 
https://www.montsame.mn/en/read/178921. 
419 Wakana Eriguchi, “The JCM Project Development by OECC” (presented at the Bilateral Business 
Matchmaking Event for the Joint Crediting Mechanism, Ulaanbaatar, November 7, 2018), accessed March 
20, 2019, http://www.jcm-mongolia.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/OECC.pdf. 
420 Anonymous (UNDPa), interviewed by author, Ulaanbaatar, March 19, 2019. 
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The IPCC lists three main barriers to technology transfer: “inadequate technical 
expertise and know-how”, “the absence of professionals in the country able to negotiate a 
suitable transfer agreement,” and “the willingness of the technology owner to transfer the 
technology.”421 Regarding overcoming the first two barriers, the necessary solution is 
training and education; for the third, financial support in addition to encouragement from 
either the originating or recipient country or international bodies may be necessary. 
Even though Mongolia has received technical support for the construction and 
deployment of niche technologies for its existing large-scale renewable systems, there is 
substantial room for additional assistance at the regime level. According to Mongolia’s 
Third National Communication under the UNFCCC: 
“There is a strong need to provide technical capacity for certain issues of climate 
change namely MRV [measurement, reporting, and verification], NAMA, the 
readiness of climate finance, climate change adaptation, and vulnerability and M&E 
[monitoring and evaluation], GHG inventory, reporting, research, and technology 
transfer.”422 
 
Mongolia’s most pressing technical problem is the lack of institutional knowledge and 
appropriate technologies.423  
V.3.2 Markets and Finances 
Moreover, additional barriers include “a lack of support by financial institutions for 
renewable energy investments (particularly hydro power plants).”424 Rather than official 
development assistance, “the implementation of economic and regulatory instruments, 
                                               
421 Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer, 98. 
422 Third National Communication of Mongolia Under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 388. 
423 Mongolia’s Initial Biennial Update Report, 16. 
424 Ibid. 
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higher per capita income and schooling levels and with stable, democratic regimes” is 
correlated with an acceleration of NHRE diffusion.425 
V.3.3 Political 
There are additional barriers that arise as a result of unanticipated political and 
economic circumstances. Even given the detail, thought, and intention put into 
Mongolia’s TNA, the reality on the ground six years later presents a slightly different 
picture of actions Mongolia has taken to mitigate the effects of climate change through 
energy sector reforms. Hydropower, while present, is not responsible for the majority of 
renewable energy sources in Mongolia. Construction of large-scale PV plants continues 
to expand rapidly in Mongolia, despite their exclusion in Mongolia’s TNA as a priority 
technology. This exclusion appears to be the result of consultants’ analysis on the 
associated capital costs for large-scale PV; in comparison to wind’s estimated capital cost 
of $5 million USD/year, solar was estimated to have an associated capital cost of $16m 
USD/year. Similarly, operational and maintenance costs for solar were calculated to be 
$23m USD/year, compared to wind’s $5.5m USD/year. The cost of solar eclipsed all of 
the other shortlisted technologies as well, leading it to score a zero in the assessment 
category for capital costs. Considering that capital costs were more heavily weighted than 
any other category in the assessment, solar was not selected as a priority technology, 
despite scoring more highly than other selected technologies in categories such as 
reduced air pollution, healthcare improvement, and energy supply improvement.426 
                                               
425 Pfeiffer and Mulder, “Explaining the Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technology in Developing 
Countries,” 287. 
426 Technology Needs Assessment: Volume 1 - Climate Change Adaptation in Mongolia (Ministry of 
Environment and Green Development, 2013), 54, accessed November 4, 2018, http://www.tech-
action.org/Participating-Countries/Phase-1-Asia-and-CIS/Mongolia. 
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This disparity between the TNA recommendations and the reality in Mongolia is 
likely due to unforeseen financial opportunities. While solar continues to necessitate high 
capital costs, financing for large-scale solar has been readily available from international 
organizations and donor countries. At Mongolia’s 9th National Renewable Energy Forum, 
which took place in 2018, a representative from the Ministry of Energy presented that 
more special licenses have been issued for photovoltaic plants than any other category of 
renewable energy system—29 compared to five for wind and three for hydropower. The 
total capacity from these 29 licenses is stated to be 727 MW.427 This expansion can be 
attributed to immense investments. According to a data from the country’s Energy 
Regulatory Commission, total investments in planned solar PV projects since 2013 equal 
$1,221 million USD, compared to only $582m for wind parks and $533m for 
hydropower.428 
Regarding domestic political capacity, the ability to implement further niche policies 
will likely be hindered by political instability as mentioned in reference to Mongolia’s 
existing regime. When asked about the inefficacy of the Mongolian Government due to 
high turnover and shifting political agendas, interviewees responded that while the 
current situation impeded progress, they did not foresee the initiation of substantial 
institutional changes to ameliorate current conditions; rather, people have become 
accustomed to the challenges and recognize that they are a part of the policy process.429 
 
V.4 Divergence from the Multi-Level Perspective 
                                               
427 O. Bavuudorj, “Present Status and Challenges of Energy Sector in Mongolia.” 
428 Jambaa, “National Renewable Energy Forum - 2018.” 
429 Anonymous, multiple (GGGIa, UNDPb), interviewed by author, Ulaanbaatar, March 19-22, 2019. 
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Similarly to Mongolia’s divergence from the MLP at the regime level, the presence of 
intermediaries, transnational actors, and donor interventions also contributes to 
discrepancies at the niche level. The ability for niche technologies and policies to be 
introduced and implemented in Mongolia is highly dependent on Mongolia’s partnerships 
with international organizations and its relationships with donor countries. As a result of 
these organizations and countries seeking to shift the overall status quo of energy regimes 
worldwide, they were highly receptive to engaging in programs and projects in Mongolia. 
While niche technologies have been built in and brought to Mongolia from third-party 
organizations and countries, technology transfer to domestic industries has been limited 
so far. Domestic production of niche technologies in Mongolia is limited; for Mongolia’s 
large-scale wind farm in Salkhit, the turbines were manufactured by GE and imported.430 
While by MLP standards this lack of transfer to domestic production may be seen as 
indicative of a lack of development and institutional capacity, interviewees importantly 
pointed out that the lack of domestic production is simply a matter of cost-
effectiveness—regardless of Mongolia’s role in initiating its energy transition, it is far 
cheaper to import renewable energy infrastructure from companies in other countries.431 
This speaks to the argument that the “phasing-in of green technologies in developing 
countries is less about discovering new technological niches and more about utilizing the 
opportunities already present that coincide with development objectives” (emphasis in 
original).432 
  
                                               
430 “GE Taps Growth in Mongolia by Powering Nation’s First Wind Farm Project.” 
431 Anonymous (ADB), interview by author, Ulaanbaatar, March 18, 2019. 
432 René Kemp and Babette Never, “Green Transition, Industrial Policy, and Economic Development,” 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 1 (February 7, 2017): 67. (Emphasis in original). 
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Chapter VI: Survey and Interview Data 
Due to limited external resources on the status of Mongolia’s renewable energy 
development, research included conducting in-person surveys and interviews in 
Ulaanbaatar and additional sites in Mongolia. Survey and interview data were collected 
during two separate phases: May 2017 and March 2019. In May of 2017, the research 
focused on Mongolians’ perceptions of renewable energy, including the government’s 
agenda and attitudes towards existing infrastructure. This research involved surveying 
and interviewing citizens of Mongolia, including those residing near large-scale 
renewable energy projects, those living in Ulaanbaatar, and individuals working directly 
on issues relating to renewable energy, whether it be policy or development. 
 
VI.1 Methodology 
VI.1.1 Location 
Surveys were disseminated during May 2017 in Darkhan, Salkhit, Hatgal, and 
Ulaanbaatar (Figure 13). Due to the fact that the first survey was distributed prior to  
 
Fig. 13. Survey locations (Esri, HERE, Garmin, NGA, USGS, 2019). 
Salkhit 
Hatgal 
Ulaanbaatar 
Darkhan 
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significant research, an additional survey was developed following interviews with 
professionals in the development and renewable energy fields. Survey sites were selected 
based on both available travel opportunities and the presence of large-scale renewable 
energy facilities—Darkhan being the site of Mongolia’s first large-scale solar farm and 
Salkhit the site of the first large-scale wind park.  
VI.1.2 Participants 
A total of 94 individuals were surveyed (Table 8).  
Table 8 
Logistics for each survey. 
Survey Sites Respondents Questions Dates 
I Darkhan 35 8 May 10-11, 2017 
 Salkhit 21  May 14, 2017 
II Hatgal 8 10 May 21, 2017 
 Ulaanbaatar 30  May 24, 2017 
 
The first survey was distributed to individuals residing in the vicinity of large-scale 
renewable energy facilities in the city of Darkhan and town of Salkhit, both living 
directly next to and slightly removed from the facilities (Figure 14). Survey II was 
distributed to individuals not residing near large-scale renewable energy facilities, in the 
town of Hatgal and city of Ulaanbaatar (Figure 15). No individual completed both Survey 
I and Survey II. Refer to the appendices for copies of each survey in English and 
Mongolian. 
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         Fig. 14. Survey I: Makeup of respondents’ residences.               Fig. 15. Survey II: Makeup of respondents.                     
The majority of survey respondents were between the ages of 30-49 (Figure 16).  
 
Fig. 16. Age demographics of Survey I (left) & II (right) respondents. 
Survey respondents were asked about their perceptions of renewable energy, as well as if 
and how renewable energy has impacted their lives. Translators were utilized in all 
survey locations to maximize the survey’s accessibility and number of respondents.  
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VI.2 Limitations 
VI.2.1 Surveys 
Rather than a single survey, two surveys were developed as a result of incomplete 
information prior to dissemination of Survey I. After Survey I was distributed, additional 
interviews were undertaken with renewable energy and development experts; information 
gleaned from these interviews directly informed the revised questions in Survey II. The 
only questions replicated from Survey I were “What do you think of the government’s 
goal to have 30% of its energy sourced renewably by 2030?” and “Have you received any 
education about renewable energy?”.   
This revision meant that Survey I respondents were unable to answer questions from 
Survey II that are critical to this research, such as how respondents thought public 
awareness about renewable energy should be improved. Alternatively, Survey II 
eliminated relevant questions from Survey I, such as if respondents would be open to 
installing a renewable energy system in their own homes. Survey II was not distributed to 
anyone living in the direct vicinity of large-scale renewable projects, thus, it was not 
possible to compare individuals’ knowledge about Mongolia’s renewable energy policy 
between those directly next to versus removed from large-scale RE systems.  
VI.2.2 Interviews 
The primary limitations for conducting interviews in March 2019 were the language 
barrier and limited availability of interviewees. While it is possible to use translators 
throughout Ulaanbaatar, due to the increased logistical challenges posed by coordinating 
translators and securing Mongolian-speaking interviewees, this option was not pursued. 
This is tied to the second limitation of limited availability; the allocation of a single week 
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towards visiting Mongolia in-person. Thus, if interviewees were unavailable during the 
single week, interviews were not conducted.  
 
VI.3 Data Analysis 
Surveys were reviewed and common themes were identified within answers where 
respondents either elaborated or provided extraneous information. All answers from both 
Survey I and Survey II were entered into a single spreadsheet.  
Notes were typed during interviews and reviewed after to ensure accuracy of 
information. Common themes were identified from interview answers, which were then 
combined onto a single document organized by theme and interviewee. 
  
VI.4 Results 
VI.4.1 Lack of Information 
In response to the questions “How much do you know about the electricity grid in 
Mongolia?” and “How much do you know about renewable energy policy in Mongolia” 
on Survey II, rates of response were similar, with fewer than 10% indicating that they 
knew a lot about the existing electricity grid (Figure 17). Only one individual responded 
that they knew a lot about Mongolia’s renewable energy policy. 
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Fig. 17. Survey II: Comparison of respondents' knowledge of Mongolia’s existing electricity grid and renewable energy 
policy. 
 
Fig. 18. Survey I: Motivation for not wanting to install residential renewable energy system. 
The majority of respondents attributed a lack of information as the primary reason they 
answered no to the question “Would you ever be open to installing a renewable energy 
system (i.e. solar panels) for your own home?” (Figure 18). 
Survey II respondents additionally reported minimally discussing renewable energy 
with their family, friends, and coworkers. When asked, “How often do you talk about 
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renewable energy with people (family, friends, coworkers, etc.)?”, 47.4% responded 
“infrequently,” 44.7% responded “never,” and just 7.9% responded “frequently.” 
Survey II respondents were also asked about if they thought the public should know 
more about renewable energy, and if so, how public awareness about renewable energy 
should be improved. The majority of respondents believed that the government and civil 
society should primarily be responsible for increasing public awareness (Figure 19).  
 
 
Fig. 19. Survey II: How public awareness about renewable energy should be improved. 
There appears to be a potential disconnect between public expectations of the 
government’s role regarding renewable energy and ministries’ own expectations. What is 
interesting is that although most respondents in Survey II thought the government should 
be responsible for increasing public awareness about renewable energy, the government 
has largely stayed away from championing public awareness campaigns, instead, 
delegating this task to NGOs and civil society groups, as well as those organizations 
involved in development.433 
VI.4.1 Normative Perceptions 
                                               
433 Anonymous (GGGIa), interview by author, Ulaanbaatar, March 20, 2019. 
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Survey I answers obtained from individuals residing near turbines of the Salkhit wind 
farm reflected trends identified with social acceptance of renewable energy projects. 
Specifically, two respondents expressed feeling initially skeptical towards the 
construction and implementation of the turbines, specifically in reference to uncertainty 
over their effect on birds and their own herds. Two respondents did say that 
representatives from the company visited in-person to describe the project and its 
environmental impacts.434 One respondent living in the direct vicinity of the turbines 
stated that they thought the turbines had led to more storms, leading him to move his 
winter herding site as a result of the changes in weather.435 
At least one respondent spoke directly to the differentiation that has been previously 
noted regarding how individuals developing countries perceive normative reasoning for 
installing renewable energy systems. When asked if she would be interested in installing 
her own solar energy system, one respondent replied “No, because I already have 
electricity.”436 This is strikingly similar to the aforementioned statement by an individual 
in Tanzania who was asked about incentives for installing renewable energy systems: “It 
doesn’t have anything to do with climate change; it is driven by rural electrification and 
people wanting electricity.”437 
Despite a lack of knowledge about renewable energy systems, very few Survey I 
respondents expressed negative views of renewable projects. 52.8% responded they had a 
                                               
434 Survey I responses: IS-WF1, IS-WF5 
435 Survey I response: IS-WF2 
436 Survey I response: IS-N1 
437 Amars et al., “The Transformational Potential of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions in 
Tanzania,” 95. 
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“positive” perception of renewable energy projects, 41.5% responded “neutral,” and 5.7% 
responded “negative.” 
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Conclusion 
Mongolia’s ongoing energy transition speaks to what others have found regarding the 
limitations of the MLP’s applicability to developing countries. Originally developed as a 
framework meant to explain historical energy transitions in developed European nations, 
the MLP is insufficient to explain many of the nuances unique to energy and 
sustainability transitions in developing countries. Thus, many authors have argued for the 
inclusion of additional frameworks and variables beyond the MLP in order to adequately 
explain ongoing transitions. 
Specifically for Mongolia, the role of transnational linkages, in the forms of 
intermediaries and donor interventions, has been paramount. Mongolia’s transition is 
characterized by niche technologies (wind turbines, PV panels) and policies (feed-in-
tariff, value-added tax exemption) that have been fully developed for other contexts and 
are being introduced into Mongolia’s unique environment. The transfer of these 
technologies has been successful largely due to partnerships Mongolia has fostered with 
international actors and its allies; projects are built according to long-term plans rather 
than singular and isolated ambitions. Mongolia has effectively involved the private sector 
in renewable energy project processes through the founding of private Mongolian 
companies to partner with international organizations and governments in order to see 
projects to fruition.  
The majority of barriers affecting the development of renewable energy in Mongolia 
stem from the regime and niche level. Mongolia’s incumbent regime is entrenched not 
only due to reliance on existing systems, but limited domestic political and economic 
capacity to initiate change, despite the government’s ideological prioritization of 
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sustainable development. Fortunately for Mongolia, it has been able to capitalize on its 
pre-existing relationships with the international community to foster long-term 
investment in renewable energy projects. This has resulted in limited cases seen in other 
countries where isolated transition projects do not lead to large-scale regime change. 
Consideration should continue to be given to the normative aspects of Mongolia’s 
transition; specifically, the diffusion of renewable energy for purposes other than the 
Western notion of existential environmentalism rooted in an appeal to morality. 
In the future, Mongolia should continue to draw on these relationships to ensure that 
future growth aligns with the government’s long-term priorities. Ensuring that any 
development projects are suitable for factors unique to Mongolia will continue to be 
crucial, as sustainable development continues to expand as a primary tool to combat the 
effects of climate change. 
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Appendix A 
Stakeholders Identified in Mongolia’s Technology Needs Assessment438 
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438Adapted from Technology Needs Assessment: Volume 2 - Climate Change Mitigation in Mongolia, 10. 
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Appendix B 
 Mongolia’s Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions439  
                                               
439 Adapted from “Copenhagen Accord: Appendix II - Mongolia: Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions of Developing Country Parties.” 
Sector Subsector Action 
Energy supply Renewable options PV and solar heating 
  Wind power  
  Hydropower 
 Coal quality Coal beneficiation 
  Coal briquetting 
 Heating boiler efficiency Improve efficiency of existing HOBs and install boilers 
with new design and high efficiency 
  Convert hot water boilers into small capacity thermal 
power plants 
 Household stoves & 
furnaces 
Change fuels for household stoves and furnaces 
  Modernize existing and implement new design for 
household stoves & furnaces 
 CHP plants Improve efficiency and reduce internal use 
 Electricity use for local 
heating 
Use of electricity from grid for individual households in 
cities 
Building Improve energy efficiency Improve district heating systems in buildings 
  Install heat and hot water meters in apartments 
  Improve insulation for existing buildings and 
implement new energy efficiency standards in new 
buildings 
  Improve lighting efficiency in buildings 
Industry Improve energy efficiency  Improve housekeeping practices 
  Implement motor efficiency improvements  
  Introduce dry-processing in cement industry 
Transport  Use more fuel-efficient vehicles 
Agriculture  Limit the increase of the total number of livestock by 
increasing the productivity of each type of animal, 
especially cattle 
Forestry  Improve forest management 
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Appendix C 
Survey I (English) 
 
Renewable Energy Policy Survey 
Name:  
Age:  
Area of residence:  
Number of people in household:  
For the following questions, please check all boxes that apply to you. Thank you!  
1. What is your perception of renewable energy projects?  ⎕ Positive ⎕ Negative ⎕ Neutral ⎕ Other (please explain below):  
  
2. What do you see as the future of renewable energy in Mongolia?  ⎕ More projects from the government and foreign companies  ⎕ More projects from private companies ⎕ Fewer projects overall ⎕ Other (please explain below):  
  
3. What do you think of the government's goal to have 30% of Mongolia's energy come from 
renewable sources by 2030?  ⎕ Realistic ⎕ Unrealistic ⎕ Other (please explain below):  
  
4. Have you received any education about renewable energy?  ⎕ Yes (please explain below) ⎕ No 
If yes, please explain the details of your education:  
 
5. Have you been personally affected by the presence of renewable energy projects?  ⎕ Yes (please explain below) ⎕ No 
If yes, please explain how you have been personally affected below:  
 
6. What comes to mind when you think of renewable energy projects? (Circle all that apply)  ⎕ Large-scale installation (able to serve many households)  ⎕ Small-scale installation (serves single household) ⎕ Other (please explain below):  
 
7. Would you ever be open to installing a renewable energy system (i.e. solar panels) for your own 
home?  ⎕ Yes ⎕ No ⎕ Other (please explain below):  
 
8. If you answered no to the previous question (7), what factors would limit you from installing your 
own renewable energy system?  ⎕ Cost 
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⎕ Lack of information ⎕ No interest ⎕ Other (please explain below):  
 
Please include any additional comments below:  
 
Thank you for taking this survey! 
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Appendix D 
Survey I (Mongolian) 
 
Сайн байна уу? Та доорх судалгааг хичээнгүйлэн бөглөж өгнө үү. 
Сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний бодлогын талаарх судалгаа 
Таны нэр: 
Таны нас: 
Оршин суугаа газар: 
Ам бүл: 
1. Сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний төсөл, хөтөлбөрүүдийн талаар та ямар ойлголттой байдаг вэ? 
А. Эерэг 
Б. Сөрөг 
В. Тодорхой ойлголтгүй 
Г. Өөр (тайлбарлана уу) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
2.Монголын сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний салбарын ирээдүйг хэрхэн харж байна вэ? 
А. Засгийн газар болон гадаадын компанийн төсөл давамгайлна 
Б. Хувийн компануудын төсөл давамгайлна 
В. Төсөл хөтөлбөрүүд бага хэрэгжинэ 
Г. Өөр (тайлбарлана уу) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
3.  Эрчим хүчний яамнаас тавьсан 2030 он гэхэд сэргээгдэх  эрчим хүчний үйлдвэрлэл/эзлэх 
хэмжээг 30 хувьд хүргэх  зорилтын талаар та юу гэж бодож байна вэ? 
А. Биелэх боломжтой  
Б. Биелэх боломжгүй  
В. Өөр (тайлбарлана уу) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
4. Та сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний талаар мэдээлэл авч байсан уу? 
А. Үгүй 
Б. Тийм (тийм дугуйлсан бол ямар мэдээлэл авч байснаа тайлбарлана уу) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
5. Сэргээгдэх эрчим хүч, түүнтэй холбоотой төсөлд өөрийн биеэр хамрагдаж байсан уу? 
А. Үгүй 
Б. Тийм(тийм дугуйлсан бол хэрхэн хамрагдаж байсан тухайгаа тайлбарлана уу) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
6. Сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний төсөл гэхээр танд ямар төсөөлөл бууж байна вэ? (Нэгээс илүү 
хариулт дугуйлж болно) 
А. Том хэмжээний бүтээн байгуулалт (олон өрхийг хамарсан)  
Б. Жижиг хэмжээний бүтээн байгуулалт (нэг өрхөд зориулсан) 
В. Өөр (тайлбарлана уу) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
7. Та өөрийн гэртээ сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний систем (жишээ нь: нарны толь) суурилуулах 
талаар бодож байсан уу? 
А. Тийм 
Б. Үгүй 
В. Өөр хариулт (тайлбарлана уу) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
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8. Өмнөх асуултанд (7) үгүй гэж хариулсан бол, ямар шалтгаанууд таны боломжийг 
хязгаарлаж  байна вэ? 
А. Өртөг өндөртэй 
Б. Хангалттай мэдээлэл байхгүй 
В. Сонирхож үзээгүй 
Г. Бусад (тайлбарлана уу) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
Нэмэлт мэдээлэл байвал доор бичнэ үү. 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
Судалгаанд хамрагдсан танд баярлалаа. Амжилт хүсье 
 
  
 
 
139 
Appendix E 
Survey II (English) 
 
Gender: 
Age: 
Place of residence:  
Name (optional):  
 
1. How much do you know about the electricity grid in Mongolia? 
a. A lot (familiar with most policies and laws relating to the electricity grid) 
b. Some (somewhat aware of electricity grid systems) 
c. Not very much (mostly or entirely unaware of policy relating to the electricity grid) 
 
2. What is your perception of Mongolia’s current energy system? 
a. Sustainable (will continue functioning in the long-term) 
b. Unsustainable (will need to undergo change) 
c. Other (please explain below) 
 
3. How do you feel about Mongolia’s current energy systems? 
a. Satisfied 
b. Unsatisfied (please explain why) 
 
4. How much do you know about renewable energy policy in Mongolia? 
a. A lot (familiar with most policies and laws relating to renewable energy) 
b. Some (somewhat aware of renewable energy policy) 
c. Not very much (mostly or entirely unaware of renewable energy policy) 
 
5. How often do you talk about renewable energy with people (family, friends, coworkers, etc.)? 
a. Never (no conversations within the past year) 
b. Infrequently (a few times a year) 
c. Frequently (about every month) 
d. Often (at least once a week) 
 
6. Do you think that people should know more about renewable energy (please explain why)? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
7. If you answered yes to #6, how do you think public awareness about renewable energy should be 
improved? 
a. Government campaigns 
b. Campaigns from NGOs/civil society 
c. Organic conversations between people 
d. Education/curricula in schools 
 
8. What do you think of the government’s goal to have 30% of its energy sourced renewably by 2030?  
a. Realistic 
b. Unrealistic 
c. Other 
 
9. Have you received any education about renewable energy? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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10. Have you ever utilized renewable energy in your own life? 
a. No 
b. Yes (if yes, please explain how) 
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Appendix F 
Survey II (Mongolian) 
 
Хүйс:  
Нас:  
Оршин суугаа хаяг:  
Нэр (бичихгүй байж болно):  
 
1. Та Монголын цахилгаан эрчим хүчний (шугам сүлжээ) тухай хэр их мэдэх вэ?  
а. Хангалттай (цахилгаан эрчим хүчний тухай хууль болон бодлогуудын талаар сайн 
мэддэг) 
б. Бага зэрэг (цахилгаан эрчим хүчний системийн талаар бага зэрэг мэддэг) 
в. Сайн мэдэхгүй (цахилгаан эрчим хүчний бодлогын талаар ихэнхийг нь эсвэл бүр юу ч 
мэдэхгүй) 
 
2. Монголын одоо ашиглаж байгаа эрчим хүчний системийн талаар ямар ойлголттой байдаг вэ?  
а. Тогтвортой (үйл ажиллагаа нь удаан хугацаанд үргэлжилнэ) 
б. Тогтворгүй (өөрчлөх хэрэгтэй) 
в. Бусад (доод зайнд дэлгэрэнгүй тайлбарлана уу) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Та Монголын одоо ашиглаж байгаа эрчим хүчний системийн талаар сэтгэл хангалуун байдаг 
уу?  
а. Тийм  
б. Үгүй (тайлбарлана уу) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. Та Монголын сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний бодлогын талаар хэр сайн мэддэг вэ?  
а. Хангалттай (сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний тухай хууль болон бодлогуудын талаар сайн 
мэддэг) 
б. Бага зэрэг (цахилгаан эрчим хүчний системийн талаар бага зэрэг мэддэг) 
в. Сайн мэдэхгүй (сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний бодлогын талаар мэдэхгүй) 
 
5. Та сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний тухай хүмүүстэй (гэр бүл, найз нөхөд, хамт олон гэх мэт) ярилцдаг 
уу?  
а. Үгүй (сүүлийн нэг жилд энэ талаар ярилцаагүй) 
б. Хааяа (жилд хэдхэн удаа) 
в. Тогтмол (сар болгон) 
г. Байнга (дор хаяж долоо хоногт нэг удаа) 
 
6. Хүмүүс сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний талаар илүү их мэдэх хэрэгтэй гэж боддог уу? (Яагаад гэдгийг 
тайлбарлана уу)  
а. Тийм  
б. Үгүй  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
7. Хэрэв 6-р асуултад тийм гэж хариулсан бол хүмүүсийн мэдлэг, мэдээллийг хэрхэн нэмэгдүүлэх 
хэрэгтэй гэж бодож байна вэ?  
а. Засгийн газраас олон нийтийг хамарсан үйл ажиллагаа явуулах  
б. Төрийн бус байгууллага/иргэний хөдөлгөөн олон нийтийг хамарсан үйл ажиллагаа 
явуулах 
в. Хүмүүсийн хооронд харилцан яриа зохион байгуулах 
г. Сургуульд хөтөлбөр болгож оруулах  
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8. Эрчим хүчний яамнаас тавьсан 2030 он гэхэд сэргээгдэх  эрчим хүчний үйлдвэрлэл/эзлэх 
хэмжээг 30 хувьд хүргэх  зорилтын талаар та юу гэж бодож байна вэ? 
а. Биелэх боломжтой  
б. Биелэх боломжгүй  
в. Өөр (тайлбарлана уу) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
9. Та сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний талаар мэдээлэл авч байсан уу? 
а. Үгүй 
б. Тийм (тийм дугуйлсан бол ямар мэдээлэл авч байснаа тайлбарлана уу) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Та сэргээгдэх эрчим хүч хэрэглэж байсан туршлага байгаа юу?  
а. Үгүй  
б. Тийм (хэрхэн ашиглаж байснаа тайлбарлана уу) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Танд баярлалаа!  
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Appendix G 
Survey Codes 
 
 
 
   
Codes for Survey I  
City Specific location Code # Surveyed 
Darkhan Gers/homes next to Darkhan Solar Plant ID-GD# 5 
Bag government offices ID-BG# 7 
Ministry of Environment and Tourism ID-MNE# 6 
Local market ID-M# 17 
Salkhit Homes in general vicinity of wind farm IS-N# 8 
Homes at the base of the wind farm IS-WF# 13 
Total   56 
    
    
    
Codes for Survey II 
City Specific location Code # Surveyed 
Hatgal Offices within Lake Huvsgul National Park IIH-NP# 8 
Ulaanbaatar Unspecified location IIU-# 17 
 Ger district IIU-GD# 3 
 School 2 IIU-S# 10 
Total   38 
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Appendix H 
Results: Survey I  
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Appendix I 
Results: Survey II 
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Appendix J 
Interview Questions (March 2019) 
 
General questions 
 
1. What is your name?  
2. Where do you work? 
3. What is your position within where you work? 
 
Renewable energy-specific questions 
 
4. Have you ever studied renewable energy or development in a formal academic 
setting? 
5. What are your thoughts on current governmental plans to increase renewable energy 
use in Mongolia? 
a. Do you think that Mongolia’s goal of increasing renewable energy capacity to 
20% by 2030 is realistic? 
6. What barriers do you feel exist to more widespread diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies in Mongolia? 
a. Do you believe Mongolia is adequately equipped to address these barriers? If 
not, what would need to change for Mongolia to address these barriers? 
7. What do you think are the best ways to increase the use of renewable energy? 
8. What are your thoughts on the role of international organizations and other countries 
in Mongolia’s renewable energy development? 
9. Do you think Mongolia will be able to eventually have a domestic renewable energy 
industry? 
a. If so, what do you believe needs to happen for a domestic energy to take 
form? 
10. Do you believe civil society will play a role in spreading renewable energy 
technologies? 
11. What is your perception of the public’s knowledge regarding renewable energy 
technologies in Mongolia?   
12. How has Mongolia attempted to overcome challenges to renewable energy diffusion? 
13. Was the implementation and amendment of laws to bolster renewable energy 
investment (i.e. the VAT law, customs law, etc.) driven by domestic or international 
actors? 
 
Development-specific questions 
 
14. How would you describe public awareness of UNDP and similar programs in 
Mongolia? 
15. What would you say is the biggest impediment to development in Mongolia? 
a. How do you think these barriers can be addressed? 
16. Do you think public support could be leveraged to increase development programs in 
Mongolia? 
17. Are there civil society organizations working to raise awareness about environmental 
development programs in Mongolia? 
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18. How would you describe the relationship between government ministries and your 
team at UNDP? 
a. How supportive has the government been of your project, and has this support 
changed at all since you started working? 
19. What is the biggest challenge you’ve faced in furthering the projects you work on? 
20. What progress have you seen since starting at the UNDP on your projects? 
21. What is the nature of the dialogue between different individuals/agencies/groups 
pursuing different sustainable development projects? 
22. Do you foresee projects like BIOFIN ever being run independently by the Mongolian 
government? 
23. Have you run into challenges pursuing programs due to industry (i.e. mining) 
interests? 
24. Does the political system in Mongolia ever pose efficacy problems? 
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Appendix K 
Description of Transition Management 
 
Transition management describes four governance domains where activities during 
transitions take place—strategic, tactical, operational, and reflexive. Each of these 
domains details different processes necessary for a transition to be planned and take 
place. 
Strategic: Activities in the strategic domain include “vision development, strategic 
discussions, long-term goal formulation, collective goal and norm setting, and long-term 
anticipation.”440  
The tactical domain is where “steering activities” take place—including actions such 
as “negotiations, planning and control, financial support, programming.” Activities 
include “agenda building, negotiating, networking and coalition building.”441 
Operational activities are short-term and often pertain to innovation. These activities 
are carried out in specific programs for innovation, as well as existing business and 
industry, political, and civil society spheres. Innovation is not limited to technological 
advances, and also includes “all societal, technological, institutional, and behavioral 
practices that introduce or operationalize new structures, culture, routines, or actors.”442 
The scope and timeline of each domain varies (Table 9). 
 
Table 9 
Characteristics of transition management levels.443 
Transition 
Management Levels Focus Problem scope Time scale 
Level of 
activities 
Strategic Culture Abstract/societal 
system 
Long-term (30 
years) 
System 
                                               
440 Loorbach, “Transition Management for Sustainable Development,” 168–9. 
441 van Welie and Romijn, “NGOs Fostering Transitions towards Sustainable Urban Sanitation in Low-
Income Countries,” 252. 
442 Loorbach, “Transition Management for Sustainable Development,” 170. 
443 Ibid., 171. 
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Tactical Structures Institutions/regime Mid-term (5-15 
years) 
Subsystem 
Operational Practices Concrete/project Short-term (0-5 
years) 
Concrete 
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Appendix L 
Partial lists of large-scale solar and wind projects in Mongolia 
 
List of Wind Projects 
 
  
                                               
444 Angarag Myagmar, “Mongolia Wind Development Status” (Ulaanbaatar, 2016). 
445 Ibid. 
Name of  
Wind Park Capacity Owner Status Location 
Annual 
generation 
Salkhit 50 MW Clean Energy  In operation Sergelen 
Soum, Tuv 
aimag 
-- 
-- 50 MW Aydiner Global  Short-term 
project (2014-
2017) 
Choir city, 
Govisumber 
province 
123 mil 
kWh 
-- 102 MW “Qleantech” LLC 
 
 
Short-term 
project (2014-
2017) 
Khanbogd 
soum, 
Umnugovi 
province 
300 mil 
kWh 
Sainshand 
Wind Park 
50 MW Sainshand Wind 
Park LLC 
In operation 
Short-term 
project (2014-
2017) 
Sainshand city, 
Dornogovi 
province 
130 mil 
kWh 
-- 
 
100 MW Clean Energy Asia 
LLC 
Long-term 
project (2018-
2025) 
Bulgan soum, 
Umnugovi 
province 
-- 
Tsetsii Wind 
Park 
50 MW Clean Energy Asia 
LLC 
Long-term 
project (2018-
2025) 
Tsogttsetsii 
soum, 
Umnugovi 
province 
-- 
-- 50 MW Khiimori salkhi 
LLC 
Long-term 
project (2018-
2025) 
Argalant soum, 
Tuv province 
-- 
-- 100 AB Solar Wind Completed 
feasibility 
study and 
license444 
Dalanjargalan 
soum,  
-- 
-- 50 TBF International 
Group 
Completed 
feasibility 
study and 
license445 
Bayan-Ovoo 
soum 
-- 
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List of Solar Projects 
 
  
Name of  
Solar Farm Capacity Operator Status Location 
International 
Involvement 
Darkhan Solar 
Farm 
10 MW Solar Power 
International, 
LLC 
In operation Darkhan JCM 
Monnaran 
solar/agriculture 
10 MW Everyday 
Farm LLC 
In operation  JCM 
Darkhan II 20 MW  Completion 
November 
2019 
Darkhan -- 
New Airport 15 MW, 
CES 
Tenuun Gerel 
Construction 
LLC 
Completion 
November 
2018 
Khushig Khundii ADB, JCM 
Bayanchandmani 21 MW  Completion 
December 
2019 
Bayanchandmani JCM 
Sumber -- -- -- -- GCF 
Choir 10 MW -- -- -- -- 
Zaminuud 15 MW -- -- -- -- 
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